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A. Introduction: 
The ongoing process of economic globalization entails integration of national 
economies into the international economy and requires internationalization of 
national business structures. The progressing internationalization and globalization 
processes do however no longer only prompt the big concerns to operate on the 
world market. To an increasing extent smaller businesses also start to maintain 
international economic relations in order to resist the national and international 
competitive pressure and to represent marketability. Cross-border partnership 
structures are consequently increasingly common.                
Their use in an international context however confronts consultants and clients with 
considerable taxing problems, due to the partnership`s heterogeneous treatment by 
different countries for civil law and tax law purposes. The same partnership may be 
treated as taxable entity in one country, but as fiscally transparent in the other 
country, where tax liability is instead conferred to the partners of the partnership. In a 
cross-border partnership structure these two basic tax concepts may clash together 
resulting in a conflict of qualification between the countries involved. As the 
countries are of a different view of who constitutes the taxpayer, the application of 
tax treaties gives rise to serious problems and may even result in double taxation not 
adequately avoided.   
Due to this potential tax conflict partnerships became a focus of discussion among 
German and international academics and subject to countless legal writings, resulting 
in various approaches and principles in this respect. The tax treatment of partnerships 
has however never been dealt with as thoroughly as by the OECD in its Partnership 
Report in 1999.1 The Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA2) insofar discussed the issue 
by reference to different cross-border partnership situations and adopted different 
approaches to solve the respective conflicts of qualification based on the purpose of a 
tax treaty, namely to eliminate double taxation and to prevent double non-taxation in 
the two contracting states.3
                                                   
1 OECD The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships Issues in International 
Taxation No 6 (1999). 
 The results of this report have been subsequently 
2 Hereinafter referred to as CFA. 
3 OECD (note 1) at para. 52. 
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incorporated in the Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention4 (OECD 
MTC5
This study deals with the issue of qualification conflicts regarding cross-border 
partnerships from a German perspective. German general and tax law treatment of 
partnerships as well as their classification for tax purposes is discussed in particular 
and serves as a point of departure throughout this study. The issues are studied in the 
context of tax treaties for the avoidance of double taxation.
).     
6 It is insofar referred to 
the provisions of the OECD MTC.7
         
 In the first parts it is looked at the interpretation 
of tax treaties, the partnership`s heterogeneous nature in civil and tax law, the 
different methods for the classification of entities for tax purposes and the actual 
origin of qualification conflicts in a cross-border situation. The main part deals with 
the taxation of cross-border partnerships based on two fixed examples, which aim at 
illustrating the different tax issues involved. The principles advocated by the OECD 
and other approaches developed in legal writings are applied to these examples and 
analyzed where appropriate. Finally the study deals with an alternative approach to 
qualification conflict. This approach may insofar be distinguished from the other 
approaches as it addresses the basic issue at another point.                                                                                   
 
 
                                                   
4 OECD Model Convention on Income and Capital as of 2008. The OECD has elaborated and 
published a Model Tax Convention aiming at providing the countries with an instrument for the 
purpose of negotiating and designing their individual Double Tax Conventions with other countries. 
The OECD Model Tax Convention is a Model Treaty text consisting of 31 articles, each with a 
commentary. See Gerrit Frotscher Internationales Steuerrecht 2ed (2005) 22; Introduction to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. 
5 Hereinafter referred to as OECD MTC. 
6 It is therefore not particularly dealt with the countries` domestic tax law. As regards the German 
domestic provisions concerning domestic partnerships and corporations see in this study chapter C s I, 
II, III, IV and concerning international taxation see in this study chapter D section I 1.. As regards the 
German unilateral rules for the elimination of double taxation see footnote 420. This shall however 
only provide for a general understanding. The specific issue of qualification conflicts is discussed 
without reference to domestic law.  
7 In fact, most of the existing Double Tax Conventions, even such negotiated between non-OECD 
members, refer to the basic structure and provisions of this Model.7  It can be regarded as `widely 
recognized source for the purpose of negotiating, designing and interpreting DTCs´7. Specific DTCs 
between countries may vary in detail and their specific analysis would extend what is possible for the 
purpose of this study. See Para 3 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. Hereinafter, when discussing 
the provisions of a Double Tax Convention it is accordingly referred to the OECD MTC. 
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B.  Interpretation of Double Tax Conventions 
I. General 
The main part of this study deals with issues regarding the application of Double Tax 
Conventions (DTC8) to the taxation of cross-border partnerships.9
German domestic law does not provide for any written rules on tax treaty 
interpretation and as DTCs are agreements between states they cannot simply be 
interpreted by referring to domestic rules of interpretation which differ considerably 
from state to state.
 Therefore it is 
important to elaborate the interpretation of these agreements, since this area of law 
may even constitute the main reason for the issues dealt with in this study.                                   
10 By the same token, a DTC cannot be interpreted by different 
interpretation methods used in the two states respectively because otherwise it would 
fail its purpose, namely to bind both states equally.11 An international approach to 
treaty interpretation is therefore required, i.e. interpretation, which lies right in the 
middle between various domestic methods acceptable by both contracting states.12 It 
is nowadays accepted that DTCs are subject to an autonomous interpretation 
according to the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties13 
(VCLT14).15
For the purposes of this study it is Art 31-32 of the VCLT which are insofar of most 
relevance. It is indicated that the VCLT even applies between countries, which are 
not yet a party to the Convention, as its provisions reflect customary law for the 
interpretation of treaties.
                                                                      
16
                                                   
8 Hereinafter referred to as DTC. 
 The relevant articles of the VCLT and their prerequisites 
are discussed in the first part of this chapter. An exception to the autonomous 
9 See in this study chapter D. 
10 Frotscher (note 4) 106. 
11 Klaus Vogel `Transnationale Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen  ´(2003) 15 
Internationales Steuerrecht (IStR) 523 at 553. 
12 Vogel (note 11) at 553. 
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. 
14 Hereinafter referred to as VCLT. 
15 Michael Lang Tax Treaty Interpretation vol 3 (2001) 134; this is also confirmed by the wording of 
Art. 1 of the VCLT according to which the rules apply to treaties between states, which equally 
includes bilateral or even multilateral DTCs. 
16 Klaus Vogel Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen 5ed (2008) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 
105.  
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interpretation constitutes art 3(2) of the OECD MTC which provides reference to the 
contracting states’ domestic law regarding terms not defined in the treaty. This 
provision departs from the autonomous treaty interpretation under the VCLT and due 
to its reference to the countries` domestic law renders it more difficult for the 
contracting countries to arrive at a common interpretation.17 Article 3 (2) may insofar 
constitute the main reason for qualification conflicts and their adverse effects and is 
therefore scrutinized in section III.18
As recommended by the OECD, the countries should base their individual DTCs on 
the OECD MTC and follow its Commentaries assisting the countries with the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Model Tax Treaty.
  
19 A considerable part of 
this study deals with the OECD Partnership Report of 1999, issued by the OECD 
CFA. This Report, which deals with the issue of qualification conflicts was 
eventually incorporated in the Commentaries to the OECD MTC. The weight of the 
commentary as instrument of tax treaty interpretation is therefore of considerable 
importance.20 That the Commentary may be an important means of interpretation is 
insofar not subject to any dispute, although there is some uncertainty as to the legal 
basis for that assumption.21 However, whether it may also affect treaties concluded 
prior to its amendment remains highly controversial.22
 
 The commentary and its role 
in the interpretation process are therefore subject to analysis in section IV.   
II. Interpretation according to art 31 – 33 of the VCLT        
1. Article 31 - General rule of interpretation 
Article 31 of the VCLT as general rule of interpretation provides the following:  
 
                                                   
17 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 112.  
18 Most treaties contain also other explicit references to the domestic law. For instance art 6 (2) of the 
OECD MTC. These references will however not be subject to any detailed analysis for a lack of 
relevance to this study. 
19 Para 3 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. 
20 Arne Schnitger `Die Einbeziehung des OECD-Kommentars in der Rechtsprechung des BFH  ´(2002) 
12 IStR 407 at 407; Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 125-127; Michael 
Lang (note 16) 134. 
21 Schnitger (note 20) at 407. 
22 Schnitger (note 20) at 407. 
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(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. 
(2) The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: 
a. any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in                                   
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
b. any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty and accepted by other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
(3) There shall be taken into account, together with the context: subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation, any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
(4) A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that parties so intended.  
 
It used to be subject to dispute whether the wording or the purpose should prevail in 
interpreting tax treaties.23 This, however, came to an end with the rules of the VCLT 
and in particular with the general rule of art 31 (1).24 Despite its general wording, it 
is now commonly recognized that it gives priority to the treaty text (textual 
approach), since it stipulates that the interpretation must be based on the terms of the 
treaty.25 This entails an objective approach rendering the terms of the treaty 
important and insofar ignoring the intention of the parties.26 The intention is of 
relevance, however, insofar as it finds its expression in the text of the treaty.27
The interpretation is based on the “ordinary meaning” of the terms which 
nevertheless does not necessarily refer to the colloquial language.
  
28 As far as a 
specific meaning of a term has developed in a relevant area and received general 
acceptance, this meaning constitutes the ordinary meaning in terms of art 31 (1).29
                                                   
23 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 102 .  
 
The ordinary meaning may thus comprise terms developed under the influence of the 
24 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 102. 
25 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 106; Vogel (note 11) at 526. 
26 Frotscher (note 4) 107. 
27 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 107; Jesper Barenfeld Taxation of 
Cross-Border Partnerships (2005) 31.  
28 Barenfeld (note 27)  27. 
29 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 108. 
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OECD MTC and its commentary in the area of DTCs, occasionally referred to as the 
`international tax language´.30 The `ordinary meaning´ shall in this regard constitute 
a borderline between `acceptable and unacceptable meanings´ of a term, in order to 
avoid an interpretation which falls outside the `normal or sensible meaning´.31
Apart from art 31 (1), it is provided in art 31 (4) that the parties may also attribute a 
special meaning to a term which may deviate from the ordinary meaning. The 
intention of the parties is then expressed in the text of the individual DTC and has 
therefore got to be considered as indicated above. 
 
The ordinary meaning has to be established based on the context of the treaty terms 
(systematic interpretation32).33 The context, as described in art 31 (2), includes text, 
preamble and annexes of a DTC, as well as additional agreements and other 
instruments or materials in connection with the conclusion of the tax treaty.34 By 
considering the type of materials it is implied that they have to be agreed on by the 
contracting parties and results in the exclusion of documents not accepted by both 
parties35. According to the systematic interpretation of the ordinary meaning not only 
the application of the term in the specific section or subsection alone is of relevance, 
but also the application in the entire treaty and further documents which became part 
of the agreement. Not included in the context are `subsequent agreements between 
the parties´ or `subsequent practices´ which nevertheless expand the context as they 
need to be considered in connection with it.36
Finally the term shall be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty (teleological interpretation
 
37).38 The treaty is thus to be interpreted in a way 
which enables it to achieve its purpose or object to the highest possible extent39
                                                   
30 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 108. 
. 
However, Vogel indicates that the purpose may not be considered an independent 
31 Barenfeld (note 27) 26. 
32 Frotscher (note 4) 107. 
33 Frotscher (note 4) 107; Barenfeld (note 27) 28. 
34 Barenfeld (note 27) 27. 
35 Barenfeld (note 27) 27. 
36 See art 31 (3) of the VCLT. 
37 Frotscher (note 4) 108. 
38 See Art 31 (1) of the VCLT. 
39 Frotscher (note 4) 108. 
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means of interpretation, as it is in turn based on the wording of the treaty text. 40 This 
in turn is implied by the words `in the light of´ the purpose.41 The purpose and object 
is accordingly a `guiding tool in the search for the ordinary meaning of a word as 
suggested in the contextual materials´42 and hence a rather secondary means of 
interpretation. 43 Furthermore as already assumed above, purpose and object are to be 
regarded as a single expression, as there is no recognizable difference in the meaning 
of these terms.44
The object of the OECD MTC constitutes the avoidance of double taxation
                                                  
45.46 
Consequently the treaty shall be interpreted in a way which avoids double taxation 
whenever possible. Lang advocates that this approach must be subject to certain 
limitations and hence cannot operate as the underlying premise for each and every 
situation.47 This approach may however be utilized as a supportive argument for the 
solution of qualification conflicts and their adverse effect, namely the unrelieved 
double taxation of cross-border partnerships.48
Whether the object of the OECD MTC also includes the avoidance of double non-
taxation, remains subject to debate.
                                                                                                                              
49
 
  
 
 
                                                   
40 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 106. 
41 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 106. 
42 Barenfeld (note 27) 28. 
43 Barenfeld (note 27) 28. 
44 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 109. 
45 For the meaning of the term `double taxation  ´see in this study chapter D section I 1.. 
46 Para. 16 of the Introduction to the Commentary on the OECD MTC; OECD Partnership Report 
(note 1) para. 53; Michael Lang `Die Vermeidung der Doppelbesteuerung und der doppelten 
Nichtbesteuerung als DBA-Auslegungsmaxime?´ (2006) 18 IStR 609 at 613; Frotscher (note 16) 108.  
47 Michael Lang The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (2000) 29; 
Michael Lang (note 46) at 613. 
48 See in this study chapter D. 
49 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) para. 52; Ekkehart Reimer `Seminar F: Die sog. 
Entscheidungsharmonie als Maßstab für die Auslegung von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen  ´(2008) 
15 IStR 551 at 551; Michael Lang (note 16) 131; Michael Lang (note 47) 29. Double non-taxation 
means that the income is neither taxed by the country of residence nor by the country of source. For 
instance, according to the tax treaty the source country regards itself as being precluded from taxing 
the income, however the same income is nevertheless exempted from tax by the country of residence 
according to the double tax relief rules of the tax treaty. For a lack of relevance to the purposes of this 
study this problem is not further dealt with. See Michael Lang (note 46). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
15 
 
2. Article 32 – supplementary means of interpretation 
Article 32 of the VCLT provides that, 
`recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from  the 
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
a. leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or    
b. leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.´ 
 
According to art 32 the supplementary means referred to either serve as a 
confirmation of the results gained from the application of art 31 or may be applied in 
order to come to a reasonable meaning of the term, if this was not possible by means 
of the interpretation under art 31. Explanations relating to a DTC, given by one state 
after the conclusion of the treaty during its domestic implementation process, are 
regularly not subject to art 32, as this material may not be considered work “of the 
treaty” and did not take part in its conclusion.50 However, art 32 also allows recourse 
to other supplementary means apart from preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, as it explicitly states `including´ which cannot be 
considered as constituting a limitation to the means enumerated in it.51
         
                                                                                                                                                                                
III. Article 3 (2) of the OECD MTC 
Article 3 (2) provides the following: 
`As regards the application of the provisions of this Convention at any time by a Contracting State, 
any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has 
at that time under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which this Convention applies, 
any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term 
under other laws of that State.´  
The practical advantages of this provision are obvious. As reference is provided for 
undefined terms the OECD MTC can be kept in a straightforward length without an 
                                                   
50 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 110.  
51 Barenfeld (note 27) 30. 
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increasing number of definitions and remains therefore easier applicable.52 Besides, 
domestic courts, authorities and the taxpayer can stick to the familiar domestic law 
meaning of tax treaty terms.53
Special interpretation rules, like particular definitions of the OECD MTC
  
54 or 
specific references to the terms domestic law understanding55 prevail over the 
general provision of art 3 (2) and therewith limit its scope.56
Compared to general interpretation rules, art 3 (2) enjoys priority. Its application is, 
however, limited by its own wording.
   
57
The provision only refers to the tax law definition, i.e. to the meaning that the term 
has `for the purposes of the taxes´. Included are only the taxes covered by the OECD 
MTC.
  
58 The tax law definition shall insofar prevail provided the term has a different 
meaning in another branch of domestic law.59 If the term has only a meaning in 
another branch of law, art 3 (2) does not apply at all.60
The dispute about, whether Art 3 (2) refers to the domestic law existing when the 
treaty was entered into (`static reference´), or to the law existing at the time of the tax 
treaty application (`dynamic reference´) is in the meantime decided in favor of the 
latter alternative.
 
61 The dynamic reference is insofar of practical advantage as it does 
not require the Contracting States to renegotiate the tax treaty but enables them to 
apply the treaty despite any amendments to their domestic law.62 It should, 
nevertheless, be subject to certain limitations and does not also cover `radical´ 
amendments to domestic law changing the tax treaty substantially.63
 
  
                                                   
52 Guglielmo Maisto Tax Treaties and domestic Law vol 2 (2006) 124-125; Andrea Amatucci 
International Tax Law (2006) 160. 
53 Amatucci (note 52) 160. 
54 For instance art 11 (3) or art 12 (2) of the MTC. 
55 For instance art 6 (2) or art 10 (3) of the MTC.  
56 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 107. 
57 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 102. 
58 According to art 2 (1) of the OECD MTC the tax treaty deals with taxes on income and capital. 
59 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 103. 
60 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 103. 
61 Michael Lang (note 16) 147; Amatucci (note 52) 161. 
62 Amatucci (note 52) 161. 
63 Guglielmo (note 52) 133; Amatucci (note 52) 161.  
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The domestic law meaning shall only be relevant if the context does not require 
otherwise.64 In this respect it is suggested that the context shall be interpreted very 
broadly.65 The rather narrow designed context in terms of art 31 (2) of the VCLT is 
insofar not of significance for the OECD MTC.66 Supportive in this respect is the 
origin of the term context from the British law defined as even encompassing the 
antecedents and the history of origin.67 The context should therefore include the 
contractual documents, the MTC and its commentary, relevant provisions of the 
domestic systems of the two contracting states and as the case may be even 
provisions of other Conventions of the contracting states.68 As far as the context 
provides compelling reasons in this broad sense, it may be departed from the 
interpretation according to the contracting states` domestic law.69
Besides its advantages indicated above, the provision may on the other hand result in 
situations where the contracting states apply a tax treaty differently (conflict of 
qualification
 
70) by referring to their diverging domestic law, giving rise to double 
taxation or even double non-taxation of income.71 In this respect, Lang tries to solve 
such conflicts in the context of cross-border partnerships by interpreting the clause 
`unless the context otherwise requires´ in a very broad way.72 This clause shall 
emphasize that the treaty should primarily be interpreted autonomously from its 
context. Recourse to the domestic law of the Contracting States may accordingly 
only constitute a subsidiary means, applicable in cases where the autonomous 
interpretation does not lead to reasonable results. Others, however, object this 
approach. 73
                                                   
64 See Art 3 (2) of the OECD MTC. 
 They nevertheless attribute to the term `context´ a very broad meaning 
which in turn also increases the possibility of an autonomous interpretation and 
decreases the possibility of a conflict of qualification when referring to the domestic 
law of the respective States.  
65 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 121. 
66 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 121. 
67 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 121. 
68 Amatucci (note 52) 161; Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 121. 
69 See Art 3(2) of the OECD MTC. 
70 Vogel (note 11) 528; Amatucci (note 52) 161. 
71 Vogel (note 11) 528; Vogel/Lehner (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 112; Reimer (note 
49) 551; Michael Lang (note 16) 146.   
72 Michael Lang (note 47) 27-8.   
73 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 121.    
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The approach advocated by Lang is further dealt with in another part of this study.74
 
       
IV. The role of the Commentary to the OECD MTC in the   
      interpretation process 
 
1. Legal basis for the consideration of the OECD Commentary 
The OECD commentary is meanwhile widely recognized as a very promising and 
important instrument for the interpretation of tax treaties.75
This recognition is, however, subject to some limitations.                                                       
  
The interpretation of Tax Treaties is governed by the VCLT and its textual 
approach.76 The commentaries are therefore without any impact if a tax treaty text 
provides for a clear wording.77 Besides, as the commentaries are based on the text of 
the OECD MTC they cannot influence the interpretation of a DTC containing a 
treaty text materially deviating from the provisions of the MTC.78 Finally, it is 
indicated that the commentaries are of more significance for OECD member states, 
compared to non –members79, as the former actively contribute to the development 
of the OECD MTC and its commentaries.80
The legal significance of the commentary for the interpretation of DTCs is based on 
the provisions of the VCLT.
  
81
Insofar the amended commentary version is clearly of significance for the 
interpretation of DTCs, concluded after its amendments became publicly known or 
officially published.
  
82
                                                   
74 See chapter D section II 1. b) aa) (1).  
  
75 Frotscher (note 4) 109; Schnitger (note 20) 408, Michael Lang (note 47) 20; Michael Lang `Seminar 
B, Teil 2: Das OECD Musterabkommen – 2001 und darüber hinaus: Welche Bedeutung haben die 
nach Abschluss eines Doppelbesteuerungsabkommens erfolgten Änderungen des OECD 
Kommentars?  ´(2001) 17 IStR 536 at 536; Michael Lang (note 16) 134; Barenfeld (note 27) 37; para 
15, 29 of the introduction to the Commentary on the OECD MTC. 
76 See in this study chapter B section I. 
77 Barenfeld (note 27) 38. 
78 Michael Lang (note 16) 136. 
79 South Africa, for instance, is not a member of the OECD. See OECD MTC. 
80 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 133; Barenfeld (note 27) 39. 
81 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 123. 
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Following the prevailing opinion in legal writings the commentary constitutes the 
expressed special meaning according to art 31 (4).83 As long as the contracting 
parties conclude tax conventions based on the wording of the OECD MTC, they 
attribute to the provisions a meaning following from the OECD MTC and its 
commentary.84 In this respect, the commentary represents the common intent of the 
parties to give a special meaning to an expression.85 Indeed, the highly professional 
and technical area of international tax law requires that terms are given special 
meanings. 86 It calls for the definition of provisions by detailed and extensive 
commentaries, which in turn indicates that the provisions in a tax treaty are intended 
to have a special meaning referred to in the commentary.87
 
 For these reasons art 31 
(4) seems to be the most reasonable legal basis for the consultation of the 
commentary in the interpretation process. The commentary is therefore to be 
regarded as the special meaning given to expressions of the OECD MTC.  
2. Relevance of the modifications of the OECD Commentary for previously 
concluded DTCs 
Another question is, whether the amended version of the commentary has any 
relevance for the purpose of interpreting tax treaties concluded prior to its 
amendments.  
According to the CFA amendments to the OECD MTC and changes to the 
commentary are without impact on the interpretation of previously concluded 
Conventions where there is a difference in substance between the provisions of those 
Conventions and the amended articles (static approach), but that other changes or 
additions to the commentary are nevertheless relevant also for the interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                
82 Michael Lang (note 47) 20; Michael Lang (note 76 ) at 536; Schnitger (note 20) at 407; Barenfeld 
(note 27) 37. 
83 Barenfeld (note 27) 41; Vogel (note 11) at 527; Michael Lang (note 16) 135; Schnitger (note 20) at 
407. However, according to other scholars the Commentary may also constitute the ordinary wording 
in terms of art 31 (1) VCLT. See Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 126.   
84 Vogel Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 126. 
85 Barenfeld (note 27) 41. 
86 Barenfeld (note 27) 41. 
87 Barenfeld (note 27) 42. 
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Conventions concluded prior to those changes or additions (`ambulatory 
approach´).88
The OECD therefore advocates an ambulatory approach as long as changes or 
additions only aim at clarifying already existing provisions.
 
89
The reason why the OECD advocates such an approach is due to practical advantages 
attached to it. 
  
Since 1992 the OECD MTC and its commentary is published in a loose-leaf system 
and the commentary in particular was subject to many amendments over the years.90 
The preference for amending the commentary instead of the OECD MTC itself is due 
to the idea, that a modified OECD MTC would not necessarily influence the bilateral 
treaty praxis.91 This would require those changes to be reflected in the individual 
bilateral tax treaties which can take many years of negotiations. On the other hand, a 
modified commentary could at least according to the OECD, directly influence even 
previously concluded bilateral DTCs without any time consuming adoption 
processes. 92
However, as the OECD does not give any reasons for its approach and is also not a 
lawmaking body
       
93, its approach has to be analyzed critically on the basis of the 
VCLT where the legal authority of the commentary can actually be drawn from.94
A later version of a commentary cannot be considered part of the context in terms of 
art 31 (2), as its changes and amendments are not made `in connection with the 
conclusion´ of a previously concluded treaty.
 
95 Furthermore, only the commentary 
existing upon conclusion of the individual DTC may in fact influence the parties` 
intention as for the meaning of the words.96
                                                   
88 Para. 35 of the Introduction on the OECD MTC. 
 For this reason a later version cannot be 
considered as ordinary meaning in terms of art 31 (1) or special meaning according 
89 Barenfeld (note 27) 45. 
90 Foreword on page 3 of the OECD MTC. 
91 Michael Lang (note 76) at 536. 
92 Michael Lang (note 76) 536. 
93 Michael Lang (note 47) 15. 
94 Seen in this study chapter B section IV. 1.. 
95 Michael Lang (note 47) 16. 
96 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 127. 
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to art 31 (4).97 By the same token art 32 cannot serve as a basis for considering the 
new version of the commentary, as it refers to material indicating the intention of the 
parties upon conclusion of a treaty.98
The ambulatory approach can also not be pursued over art 31 (3) as the amendment 
decision taken by the OECD CFA does not qualify as an `agreement´ since the 
OECD MTC and its commentary is drafted by an international organization and not 
by the contracting parties to the tax convention.
  
99 Neither does subsequent practice 
apply, because it does not cover or justify changes of already existing treaty 
provisions.100
Apart from the provisions of the VCLT which do not provide support for the 
consideration of a later version of the commentary for the interpretation of 
previously concluded tax treaties, one could argue that the parties to a tax treaty 
usually accept the interpretation according to the commentary despite any future 
changes at the moment of conclusion.
       
101
However, there are other reasons which render such an approach unreasonable. 
 
By assuming, that it is the interpreter`s task to investigate the intention of the parties 
as legislators of the respective DTC, one underlines the irrelevance of the later 
version of the commentary, since the parties simply could not agree with a meaning 
of a provision they did not know at the time of the conclusion of the treaty.102
Furthermore, the ambulatory approach does not comply with many countries` 
constitutional law as the principle of separation of powers prohibits the tax 
authorities to act as a legislator.
  
103
                                                   
97 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 127. 
 In Germany, for instance, art. 59 (2) of the 
Constitution requires parliamentary consent in case of a substantive change of an 
international contract. There is thus basically no way that such a consensus could be 
substituted by a decision of the OECD CFA, unless the amendment constitutes a 
98 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 127. 
99 Michael Lang (note 47) 17. 
100 Michael Lang (note 47) 18. 
101 Barenfeld (note 27) 46. 
102 Michael Lang (note 76) at 536. 
103 Articles 1 Abs. 3, 20 Abs. 2, 20 Abs. 3 and 20a of the German Constitution. 
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mere clarification of an existing legal provision.104 As the notion of clarification is 
sometimes utilized by the authorities to justify the ambulatory approach and apply 
provisions to the disadvantage of the individual taxpayer105 and as it can be very 
difficult to differentiate clearly between a mere clarification and a substantive 
change, it has to be approached with the utmost caution.106 Besides, it is in fact 
absurd to consult a new version of the commentary when the content did not change 
compare to the old version but merely clarified the previous provision, as these 
provisions already allowed for the newly incorporated interpretation and hence make 
the consultation of the later version redundant.107
The rule that changes or amendments should influence the interpretation of 
previously concluded tax treaties has been explicitly incorporated in the recent treaty 
between Germany and Austria.
 
108 However, also in this regard it remains uncertain 
how this rule can be binding considering the indicated constitutional concerns.109
In conclusion, a “retroactive effect”
    
110
In this respect the newly incorporated Partnership Report is to be regarded as a 
substantive change of the commentary and therefore not to be considered for 
previously concluded treaties.
 of the OECD commentary cannot be based on 
any provision of the VCLT and it does, even if nevertheless applied, not comply with 
the requirements of the constitution.  
111
It could only insofar influence earlier tax treaties as its reasoning is convincing.
  
112
 
     
                                                   
104 Michael Lang (note 16) 137. 
105 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 129; Michael Lang `DBA und 
Personengesellschaften – Grundfragen der Abkommensauslegung  ´(2007) 17 IStR 606 at 606-7. 
106 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung des OECD-MA margin number 129.  
107 Michael Lang (note 105) at 607. 
108 Double Tax Convention of 24 August 2000, No 16 of the Final Protocol, quoted in Vogel (note 16) 
Einleitung OECD-MA margin number 127. 
109 Vogel (note 16) Einleitung OECD-MA margtin number 129. 
110 Michael Lang (note 16) 137. 
111 Schnitger (note 20) at 408. This applies to all tax treaties concluded prior to april 2000. See Hans 
Weggenmann `Die Empfehlungen der OECD an den Ansässigkeitsstaat zur Lösung von 
Einordnungskonflikten in Bezug auf Sondervergütungen  ´(2002) 18 IStR 614 at 623.  
112 Michael Lang (note 47) 20. However according to Lang the incorporated Partnership Report is to a 
great extent lacking such reasoning and therefore only of little value for the interpretation of 
previously concluded tax treaties. 
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3. Consideration of the OECD commentary in German case law 
In general, the OECD MTC and its commentaries have been frequently utilized for 
the interpretation of bilateral treaty provisions by German tax courts.113
Whether the German jurisdiction pursues a static or ambulatory approach with 
respect to the commentary is a more difficult question. There are particularly four 
significant cases in this respect. 
 This 
underlines the general recognition of the commentary as significant tool for the 
interpretation process. 
In a 1990 decision the BFH114
The decision of 1997
 had to deal with the DTC between Germany and 
Belgium and particularly with the concept of an artist for tax treaty purposes. For this 
purpose the BFH consulted the OECD MTC and its commentary on basis of the 
VCLT without mentioning the specific provision. However, the BFH used not the 
updated version of the commentary, but the commentary valid at the time of 
conclusion of the DTC. Despite the fact, that the BFH did not reason why it was 
reluctant to consult the later version of the commentary and failed to mention the 
constitutional relevance of such a consultation, the decision indicates that the BFH 
pursued the static approach regarding the Commentary to the OECD MTC. 
115
In a 2000 judgment the BFH seemed to rather pursue a static approach.
 was also concerned with the concept of an artist in terms of 
the German DTC with the UK. In this judgment the BFH, however, referred to the 
1977 version of the commentary in order to interpret a provision of the tax treaty 
between Germany and the UK concluded prior to the amended version of the 
commentary. Nevertheless, it cannot be determined whether the BFH clearly pursued 
the ambulatory approach in this respect, as it used the commentary only as additional 
source in order to support its view and also failed to mention any reasoning for the 
consultation of the later version of the commentary.  
116
                                                   
113 Michael Lang (note 16) 
 The court 
dealt with the income classification of an Austrian professional sportsman who 
114 BFH 11.04.1990, I R 75/88, BFHE 160, 513. Quoted and discussed in Schnitger (note 20) at 408. 
115 BFH 08.04.1997, I R 51/96, BStBl II 1997. Quoted and discussed in Schnitger (note 20) at 409. 
116 BFH 11.10.2000, I R 44-51/99, IStR 2001, 182 m. Anm. KB. Quoted and discussed in Schnitger 
(note 20) 409. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
24 
 
attended German sport events. Without clearly stating its attitude towards the 
ambulatory approach with respect to the commentary, the court specifically found 
that the version of German domestic law valid at the moment of the conclusion of the 
treaty is considered of significance when interpreting a tax treaty according to 
domestic law. 
However, the decision of 2001 appears to show a change of the BFH jurisdiction in 
this respect. 117
To sum up, at least recently the BFH does not seem to clearly object an ambulatory 
approach. However, it should more expressly mention the approach it pursues and 
deal with the possible constitutional issues involved. Otherwise the rather 
inconsistent jurisdiction and the lack of clear reasoning in past decisions results in 
legal unpredictability from the perspective of the taxpayer and the tax authorities in 
this respect.      
 The concept of an artist and the DTC between Germany and Austria 
and Germany and the Netherland were subject to the judgment. The BFH supported 
its decision by expressly referring to a later version of the commentary of 1977. 
However, once again it did not reason its reference and failed to discuss the 
constitutional issues of such reference. 
    
    
C. Partnerships and their qualification for tax purposes 
I. General:  
As this study deals with partnerships and their tax treatment in cross-border 
situations it is object of the following chapter to illuminate different features of 
partnerships and their different qualification for tax purposes. The point of departure 
in this respect constitutes the German partnership understanding as the study 
especially focuses on the German perspective regarding the taxation of cross-border 
partnerships.                                                      
                                                   
117 BFH 18.07.2001, I R 26/01, IStR 2001, 653. Quoted and discussed in Schnitger (note 20) 410. 
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The different German partnership forms are subject to examination under section II. 
The section does not discuss the subject in depth, but rather focuses on the main 
features that are essential to distinguish partnerships from other contractual 
relationships and corporations. In fact, there is no common internationally 
recognized definition for partnerships.118
As indicated partnership`s civil law and tax law treatment varies considerably 
between countries` jurisdictions. Insofar the countries` domestic tax law approach 
regarding partnerships is of particular relevance for this study, as it constitutes a 
trigger for qualification conflicts concerning cross border partnerships and therewith 
a cause for the many issues involved.
 However, one can extract the main 
characteristics from the German understanding of its domestic partnerships, to 
narrow down the concept of partnerships, as it should also be understood in a more 
general international context.                                 
119
After narrowing down the concept of partnerships, the basic concept of their taxation 
in comparison to corporations are subject to analysis in section III. In this respect, 
specific reference is given to the German legislation.  
 The partnership`s legal and tax law status in 
Germany and internationally is therefore dealt with in section III.  
As there is a main difference with regard to their respective taxation, the countries` 
classification of entities as partnerships or corporations is focused on in section IV. 
If the countries in a cross-border situation classify or treat the same entity differently 
for tax purposes the concepts of taxation regarding partnerships and corporations 
may clash together and provide for various tax issues.120
 
 The origin of such conflicts 
of qualification is dealt with in section V.  
II. The general law concept of partnerships 
In order to distinguish the partnership from other contractual relationships and 
particularly from corporations, it is essential to define the main characteristics a 
partnership features.  
                                                   
118 Barenfeld (note 27) 55. 
119 See in this study discussion regarding art 3 (2) of the OECD MTC in chapter B section 3. 
120 See in this study chapter D. 
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In Germany the civil law partnership121, the general partnership122 and the limited 
partnership123 constitute the main legal partnership forms. 124
The German definition of a civil law partnership sets up the legal basis for the other 
German partnerships
 Their basic 
characteristics are dealt with in the following as far as they are of relevance from 
distinguishing the partnership from other legal phenomena and from corporations in 
particular.     
125 and shall therefore serve as a point of departure. Article 707 
of the Civil Code126
`Through the partnership contract, the partners commit themselves mutually to promote a common 
objective in a commonly agreed upon way, especially to contribute the agreed upon resources .´ 
 provides as follows: 
By considering this basic definition there are a few main features which have to be 
taken into account when describing a partnership in Germany. A partnership involves 
a contractual relationship between persons aiming at pursuing a joint aim, ie the 
sharing of benefits127
These features can be used to distinguish the partnership from other contractual 
relationship, such as loan agreements, lease contracts and licenses, where opposite 
parties are involved and where a joint aim and joint contribution of resources is 
missing.
 arising from the joint contribution of resources. 
128 As it also requires the cooperation between persons for the purpose of 
reaching a joint goal, the sole proprietorship must also be excluded from the meaning 
of a partnership.129
                                                   
121 In Germany referred to as `Gesellschaft Bürgerlichen Rechts .´ 
 
122 In Germany referred to as `Offene Handelsgesellschaft .´ 
123 Referred to as `Kommanditgesellschaft  ´in Germany. 
124 The German silent partnership (`stille Gesellschaft´) constitutes a specific form of the civil law 
partnership. It deviates, however, considerably from the three main partnership forms and its specific 
features are not of relevance to the purpose of this study. Therefore it not subject to further 
examination. For an overview in this respect see Barenfeld (note 27) 78-80. 
125 Such as the general partnership and the limited partnership. According to section 105 (3) 
Commercial Code the provisions regarding the civil law partnership in the Civil Law Code are also 
applicable to the general partnership and the limited partnership, unless there are overriding specific 
provisions in the Commercial Code addressing the particular features of the general and limited 
partnership. 
126 Referred to as `Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch  ´in Germany. 
127 A.H.M. Daniels Issues in International Partnership Taxation (1991) 3. 
128 Barenfeld (note 27) 63. 
129 Barenfeld (note 27) 63-4. 
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These basic characteristics are also shared by the German general and limited 
partnership. The basic structure of the civil law partnership is however expanded and 
modified by the Commercial Code130
The general partnership is insofar defined as: 
 for these more complex partnership types. 
`A civil law partnership of which the purpose is to conduct a trade or business under a common 
firm…´131
In contrast to the civil law partnership the general partnership accordingly aims at 
carrying on a business or trade.
 
132
The main characteristic of a limited partnership is that at least one or several but not 
all partners are subject to limited liability.
 
133 This distinguishes the limited from the 
general partnership134 where all partners are jointly liable to the partnership`s 
creditors.135
One can therefore generally conclude that a partnership has at least one partner who 
is subject to unlimited personal liability which in turn distinguishes the partnership 
from a corporation where the liability of the members is completely replaced by the 
liability of the entity itself.
 
136 The creditors are in this respect confined to the 
corporation`s assets, ie its share capital.137
The composition of the partners in the partnership and their personal economic status 
are therefore of influence to the level of security of third parties.
 
138
                                                   
130 Art 161 (1) of the German Commercial Code. Referred to as `Handelsgesetzbuch  ´in Germany. 
 A change of 
members in a corporation on the other hand is of no impact for its share capital and 
131 Section 105 (1) Commercial Code. 
132 Daniels (note 127) 4. 
133 Section 161 (1) Commercial Code. The liability is insofar limited to their capital contribution. 
134 The provisions for the general partnership are according to section 161 (2) Commercial Code 
basically also applicable to the limited partnership. However the limited partnership constitutes a 
specific form of the general partnership. 
135 Section 105 (1) Commercial Code . 
136 Section 13 (2) Limited Liability Companies Act (in Germany referred to as `Gesetz für die 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung´) regarding a limited liablility company (in Germany referred 
to as `Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung´) and section 1 (1) Public Limited Companies Act (in 
Germany referred to as `Gesetz für die Aktiengesellschaft´) regarding a company limited by shares 
(Aktiengesellschaft). One may also find the designations `partner-oriented  ´and `capital oriented  ´
entity with respect to partnerships and corporations respectively. These terms refer to the source 
serving as security and basis for the liability. See Barenfeld (note 27) 60.  
137 Rijkele Betten `The international guide to partnerships  ´(2005) IBFD Germany-Partnerships 1.1.. 
Available at http://ip-online2.ibfd.org/igp/,06/09/2005 [accessed 4 December 2009].  
138 Barenfeld (note 27) 61. 
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hence does not influence the level of liability of the company.139 For these reasons 
the ownership in a corporation is freely transferable however subject to limitation 
with regard to partnerships.140
Finally, partnerships are characterized by personal connectivity
 
141 which is expressed 
in many provisions in the German legislation. According to s 119 of the Commercial 
Code the decision making process of a partnership requires unanimity among its 
partners. Furthermore s 709 of the Civil Code and s 114 of the Commercial Code 
generally provide for joint agency by all partners, unless one partner is designated as 
agent in the partnership agreement.142 The partners are basically allowed to represent 
the partnership to the outside world.143 A further indication for the personal 
connectivity within a partnership is the fact that it may either by law or by agreement 
be terminated upon death or withdrawal of a partner.144
A corporation in contrast is characterized by its indefinite and independent 
existence.
 
145 It can accordingly be represented by non-members.146
These distinctions become however less clear regarding a compound entity, 
consisting of a limited liability company being the sole general partner of a limited 
partnership and limited partners of the limited partnership being typically also the 
members of the limited liability company.
 
147 Such a compound entity contains 
elements of both a corporation and a partnership but is nevertheless regarded as 
partnership according to German law.148
                                                   
139 Barenfeld (note 27) 61. 
 
140 Section 15 (1) Limited Liability Companies Act; Barenfeld (note 27) 61. 
141 Daniels (note 127) 4. 
142 Section 114 (2) Commercial Code. 
143 Section 714 Civil Law Code; s 125 Commercial Code. 
144 Section 723, 727 (1) Commercial Code.  
145 As indicated in section 13 (1) Limited Liability Companies Act; Rijkele (note 137) Germany-
Partnerships 1.2.3.. 
146 Section 26 (1) Civil Law Code; section 35 (1) Limited Liability Company Act; section 76 (1) 
Public Limited Companies Act. 
147 In Germany referred to as `GmbH & Co KG .´ 
148 Wolfgang Jakob Einkommensteuer 3ed (2003) 328. Considered a limited partnership with the 
GmbH as its only unlimited partner. Insofar the provisions dealing with limited partnerships apply. 
For its tax treatment see s 15 (3) of the German Income Tax Act. That it constitutes a recognized 
partnership form, is also indicated by section 19 (2) and 125a (1) of the German Commercial Code.  
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By ignoring the specific German legislation and particularities in this respect, the 
above characteristics of German partnership types could also provide for a more 
general concept of partnerships utilizable as definition in an international context.149
 
 
III. General law and tax law status of partnerships  
The above definition does, however, not say anything about a partnership`s legal 
status and whether it can be regarded as a person liable to tax as such. These features 
are of specific interest for the purpose of this study and dealt with in the following. 
 
1. General law status 
Legal capacity means the ability to be a subject of legal rights and duties.150 Natural 
Persons take over such a capacity by birth151 and juridical persons like 
corporations152 regularly as from their official recognition.153
In some countries partnerships are treated like corporations for general law 
purposes.
  
154
According to German civil law, however, partnerships are not regarded as juridical 
persons.
 Insofar they are regarded as separate legal entity with legal capacity. 
155
Whether partnerships can have the capacity to be a subject of legal rights and duties 
despite their lack of legal personality is subject to debate in Germany. 
 
Some scholars still argue that only the partners are able to be subject of legal rights 
and duties and not the partnership as such156
                                                   
149 Barenfeld (note 27) 55-66 and particularly 66; see also Daniels (127) 3-4. 
.  
150 Barenfeld (note 27) 69. 
151 Section 1 of the Civil Law Code.  
152 A Corporation is considered a legal person according to s 1 (1) Public Limited Companies Act and 
s 13 (1) Limited Liability Companies Act. As consequence of its conferred legal personality it has 
accordingly legal capacity distinct from its members. 
153 For instance by their entry in the company registry. See insofar s 41 (1) Public Limited Companies 
Act and s 11 (1) Limited Liability Companies Act. 
154 Emil Brincker et al International tax: a South African perspective (2003) 558. This applies for 
instance to partnerships in Denmark. 
155 Karsten Schmidt `Die BGB Außengesellschaft: rechts- und parteifähig- Besprechung des 
Grundlagenurteils II ZR 331/00 vom 29.1.2001  ´(2001) 14 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 993 
at 996. 
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However most scholars in Germany meanwhile recognize the partnership as form of 
independent legal organization which may participate in legal relations and be 
subject of legal rights and duties, distinct from its partners.157
The German Civil Law Code seems to confirm this latter approach by expressly 
recognizing the legal capacity of partnerships.
 According to this 
prevailing `collective entity´ approach the partnership is however to be regarded as 
only partly capable of holding rights. Although it may act independently in external 
legal relations, it is still not completely independent regarding its internal relations to 
its partners. 
158
Furthermore, s 124 (1) Commercial Code expressly provides that a German general 
partnership
 This can also be supported by the 
wording of s 733 (1) 1 Civil Law Code which says `joint debts´ instead of the 
partner`s individual liabilities. By the same token s 718 (1) Civil Law Code says 
`joint capital of the partners´. 
159
A partnership may therefore in Germany be considered as having partial legal 
capacity distinct from its partners. 
 may acquire legal rights and accept obligations. It may also acquire 
ownership and be a party to court proceedings.  
 
2. Tax law status 
As seen above, a partnership`s treatment for civil law purposes may vary from 
country to country.  In German civil and commercial law a partnership is more or 
less considered a person with legal capacity. 
For German income tax purposes the partnership is however rather ignored according 
to the transparency principle160.161
                                                                                                                                                
156 Jakob (148) 321. Referred to as `Traditional approach .´  
 
157 Jakob (148) 321. 
158 See s 14 (2) of the Civil Law Code. 
159 This applies according to s 161 (2) Commercial Code also to the German limited partnership. 
160 Frotscher (note 4) 170; Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.3.1.; Vogel (note 16) OECD-
MA Art 1 margin number 17. In Germany referred to as `Mitunternehmerkonzept .´ 
161 Frotscher (note 4) 170.  
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Partnerships are not regarded as taxpayers but as fiscally transparent acting as a 
conduit for tax purposes.162 Accordingly, the partnership`s profits and losses flow 
through to the partners, considered to be the only taxpayers subject to individual 
income tax or corporate tax163 regardless of any distribution or withdrawal.164
Within this concept, according to which the income is only subject to tax in the 
hands of the partners, there are two different approaches to be distinguished. 
 
Some countries165, such as Germany, still treat a partnership as an independent entity 
in some ways.166 According to that approach, partnerships are utilized as accounting 
entity, ie the income is computed and reported at the partnership`s level167 where the 
corresponding accounting elections are applied.168 In this very respect the partnership 
is treated `as if it were a taxpayer´169.170 The ascertained total profits of the 
partnership, however, are then to be allotted to the partners according to their 
respective share of these profits and are eventually taxed only at their level.171 
Procedurally, this is carried out through s 180 (1) No 2 (a) of the Internal Fiscal 
Code172 which ultimately results in a binding assessment of the partners` shares of 
the partnership`s profit (s 182 (1) of the Fiscal Code).173
                                                   
162 Jakob (note 148) 320; Frotscher (note 4) 170. This however only applies to income tax. For 
business tax and VAT purposes the partnership is considered a taxpayer in Germany. As this study 
focuses only on income tax issues, these tax types are not subject to further discussion. 
 
163 Section 1 (1) and s 2 of the Income Tax Act applies in case of a natural person as partner. Section 1 
(1) and s 8 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act (referred to as `Körperschaftssteuergesetz  ´in Germany) 
applies if the partner constitutes a corporation. 
164 Jacobs Internationale Unternehmensbesteuerung 6ed (2007) part 4 chapter 4 A. II. 
165 The USA for instance. See Daniels (127) 24. 
166 Frotscher (note 4) 170; Jakob (note 148) 336-337; Barenfeld (note 27) 73-4. Referred to as `entity 
approach .´ Also applied by Canada, Finland and the USA. See Olivier 558-9 and Daniels (note 127) 
24.   
167 Jakob (note 148) 336-337. 
168 Daniels (note 127) 27. 
169 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.3.1.. 
170 Prior to 1975 the `Bilanzbündel  ´theory applied, according to which the partnership was 
completely ignored. Subject to tax was only the individual partner, which was treated as a sole 
proprietor. The partnership was regarded as a `bundle  ´of all partners` accounts. This approach was 
eventually abandoned and replaced by the entity approach, described above. See Jakob (note 148) 
336. 
171 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A. I. .    
172 In Germany referred to as `Abgabenordnung .´ 
173 Jakob (note 148) 347. 
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In addition to the utilization as accounting entity partnerships are in Germany also 
treated as entity for the purpose of characterizing the income.174 The partnership 
carries out the taxable activity as representative for all partners.175 In Germany 
different provisions and tax consequences are allocated to different sources of 
income.176 Thus, In order to determine whether the income is taxable and according 
to which provisions, common criteria apply for the characterization of the source of 
income at the level of the partnership which may then result in a partnership carrying 
out a trade or business177, a freelance partnership178 or even a partnership earning 
capital income or income from rent and lease179. To each of these forms of 
partnerships the above entity approach generally applies, however, the type of 
income ultimately taxed in the hands of the respective partners and the applicable 
provisions, also those referring to the determination of the income at the partnership 
level, may vary accordingly.180 Provided the partnership carries out a trade or 
business, s 15 (1) No 2 applies and the partner earns business income according to its 
share in the partnership if he can be regarded as an entrepreneur of the latter.181
                                                   
174 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.3.1.. 
    
175 Jakob (note 148) 327. 
176 Jakob (note 148) 24. As set out in s 2 (1) of the Income Tax Act, only specifically enumerated 
sources of income are subject to tax. 
177 See s 15 (2) of the Income Tax Act for the features of a business partnership. These business 
partnerships are referred to as `Mitunternehmerschaft  ´and subject to s 15 I No 2 of the Income Tax 
Act. Section 15 (3) No 2 renders every partnership a business partnership, whatever income it actually 
earns, if it consists of a corporation as the only general partner, and if this corporation or a non-partner 
is also the authorised manager of the partnership. This regularly applies to the German GmbH & Co 
KG. See Jakob (note 148) 328. 
178 See s 18 (1) of the Income Tax Act. These partnerships are nevertheless treated like business 
partnerships and are subject to the same provisions. 
179 See s 20 or 21 of the Income Tax Act. 
180 Jakob (note 148) 327-9; see also footnote 219. 
181 Jakob 321-3. Referred to as `Mitunternehmer  ´in Germany. In this respect, specific qualities, like 
`Mitunternehmerrisiko  ´and Mitunternehmerinitiative´, are required of the partner in order to be 
regarded as entrepreneur. Provided this is fulfilled, s 15 (1) No 2 applies and allots the profits of the 
partnership to the respective partner according to its share after being determined at the level of the 
partnership.                                                       
Section 15 (1) No 2 would also apply in case of a freelance partnership (s 15 (1) No 2 read with s 18 
(4) of the Income Tax Act) and even if the partnership would carry out activities of agriculture and 
forestry (s 15 (1) No 2 read with s 13 (7) of the Income Tax Act). Both forms of income are like 
business income regarded as `profit income  ´(`Gewinneinkünfte´) and are subject to the same 
provision for the determination of the taxable income (s 2 (2) No 1 of the Income Tax Act).                                                                                                               
However, in case of a partnership that earns capital income or income from rent and lease s 15 (1) No 
2 is not applicable. Besides, unlike profit income, they are subject to s 2 (2) No 2 of the Income Tax 
Act for the purpose of determining their taxable income.       
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In Short, the partnership is in Germany treated as independent entity for accounting 
and income characterization purposes.   
Other countries, however, ignore the partnership completely for tax purposes and 
regard it as `the aggregation of the partners` businesses´182.183 According to that 
`aggregate approach´184 the taxation and the computation of the income takes place 
at the partner`s level only.185 The accounting elections are carried out at the same 
level.186 The partnership is fiscally not existent187 and the income reported by the 
partnership of no relevance for the taxation of the partner`s income.188 Insofar the 
aggregate approach corresponds to the `Bilanzbündel´189  theory, applied in Germany 
prior to the `entity approach´ described above. Insofar each partner is regarded as 
carrying out its own business according to its share of the total business of the 
partnership.190
It has to be considered that the entity approach is without prejudice to the general 
transparency principle. The partnership might thus be utilized as entity in some ways, 
it is, however, still regarded as transparent concerning the taxation of the income and 
leaves the partner as only taxpayer, liable and subject to income or corporate tax.
   
191 
The entity approach for the purpose of accounting and characterizing the income is in 
this respect rather of technical relevance and shall not influence the general 
recognition of a partnership as fiscally transparent.192
                                                   
182 Daniels (note 127) 28. 
  
183 For instance the Netherlands and Italy. See Brincker (note154) 560. Some countries, like Sweden, 
have chosen a middle course between the aggregate and the entity approach. See Barenfeld (note 27) 
74-5 
184 Daniels (note 127) 29. 
185 Barenfeld (note 27) 74.. 
186 Daniels (note 127) 29 
187 Barenfeld (note 27) 74. 
188 Daniels (note 127) 29. 
189 See footnote 170. 
190 Jakob (note 148) 336-337; Daniels (note 127) 29. 
191 Barenfeld (note 27) 74, Jakob (note 148) 337. See also OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 14. It 
was specifically dealt with that issue in the context of the application of the OECD MTC to 
partnerships. See chapter D section II a) aa) (1) in this study. 
192 Jakob (note 148) 337. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
34 
 
In contrast to the transparency principle applied in Germany there are also countries 
which treat partnerships as non-transparent separate corporations for tax purposes. 193 
In this respect the partnership itself is regarded as liable to tax and seen as own 
taxable entity paying its taxes and declaring them accordingly like a corporation.194 
The shareholder is then taxed upon distribution of the entities` profits.195
Other countries even provide for an election as to the tax treatment of the entity as 
non-transparent corporation or transparent entity.
 Countries 
applying such an approach are for instance Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Colombia.                                        
196
 
    
IV. The general difference in taxation of fiscally transparent and fiscally non 
transparent entities. 
With regard to business entities seen as fiscally transparent, income passes through to 
the partners and is subject to tax in their hands only.  
Germany applies a `single tax pattern´197 to partnerships and taxes the income only 
once at the level of the partners.198 Any succeeding distribution of income is insofar 
of no relevance for the taxation as it was already taxed in the hands of the partners. 
The distribution is rather regarded as `transfers of previously taxed funds´199 or non-
taxable withdrawals200 and therefore ignored for German tax purposes.201 
Accordingly, the income `is subject to full and final taxation when earned´ at the 
level of the partner.202
                                                   
193 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A. I. 1. b. Referred to as `non-transparency approach´ and 
particularly applied by countries with a Roman concept of law like Belgium, Spain Portugal and Latin 
American countries. See Daniels (note 127) 8.  
  
194 Frotscher (note 4) 170; Brincker (note 154) 550. For the general taxation of corporations see 
chapter C. section IV. 
195 Brincker (note 154) 552. 
196 See elective approach discussed in chapter C section V 2. b) in this study. 
197 Barenfeld (note 27) 98. 
198 Jakob (note 148) 320. 
199 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 49. 
200 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.2.. 
201 Barenfeld (note 27) 98. 
202 Barenfeld (note 27) 98-99. 
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With respect to business entities seen as a taxpayer separate from its members, 
however countries generally pursue a `double-tax pattern´203.204
Contrary to partnerships, corporations are in Germany considered as juridical person 
with own legal personality in civil and commercial law and regarded as independent 
taxpayer for income tax purposes.
 
205 According to s 1 of the German Corporate Tax 
Act a corporation itself constitutes a person liable to unlimited taxation on its 
income206.207 As long as this income is retained by the corporation, its shareholder is 
not involved for tax purposes. Only on distribution the shareholder`s respective share 
of the income is subject to taxation.208
`The imposition of tax on the same income in the hands of different taxpayers´
 This system therefore implicates economic 
double taxation which can be summarized as: 
209
The income of the corporation is subject to corporate tax at its level. This income 
distributed is referred to as dividends and subject to tax at the level of the shareholder 
upon distribution. Hence the economic result is taxed twice in the hands of the 
corporation and on distribution in the hands of the individual shareholder.  
. 
Countries` domestic tax systems deal differently with economic double taxation and 
entertain different tax concepts dealing with the corporate tax at the entity level 
and/or the dividend tax at the shareholder level.210 As a result of these different 
approaches the double taxation may be relieved completely in some countries and in 
others only partly.211 Still other countries do not provide any method and leave the 
double taxation completely unrelieved.212
                                                   
203 Barenfeld (note 27) 93. 
  
204 Jakob (note 148) 319. In Germany referred to as `Trennungsprinzip .´ Usually applied regarding 
corporations, however by some countries also pursued with respect to partnerships. See footnote 193. 
205 Jakob (note 148) 355-6; Frotscher (note 4) 196. 
206 Income in terms of s 7 Corporate Tax Act. 
207 According to s 2 No 1 Corporate Income Tax Act a corporation may be subject to limited taxation 
if it has neither legal seat nor place of effective management in Germany. 
208 According to s 20 (1) No 1 Income Tax Act in case of an individual as shareholder. In case of a 
corporation as shareholder s 8b (1) and (5) of the Corporate Tax act apply and exempt 95% of the 
dividends from corporate tax. 
209 Barenfeld (note 27) 86; similar Frotscher (note 4) 5-6. 
210 Barenfeld (note 27) 93-94. 
211 Barenfeld (note 27) 93-94. 
212 Barenfeld (note 27) 94. 
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In this respect Germany applies a partial income method as from 2009. This concept 
was introduced after the business tax reform 2008 in order to replace the former half 
income method 213, according to which only half of the dividends income and capital 
gains from equity participations were subject to tax214and only half of the 
expenditures deductible215
Like the half income method the newly introduced method is aiming at avoiding 
double taxation of distributed profits which were already subject to taxation at the 
level of the corporation. 
.  
However, in contrast to the former concept, it differentiates between business assets 
and private assets and exempts only 40% of the dividends income and capital gains 
from taxation. 216
Besides, the legislator reduced the corporate tax rate levied at the level of the 
corporation from 25% to 15%, which in turn is compensated through the increase of 
the taxability of the dividends income and capital gains from 50% under the former 
half income method to 60% under the new method. 
   
The latter, like the replaced former method, nevertheless only applies to dividends 
income and capital gains received from natural persons. 
With regard to corporations as shareholders s 8b Corporate Tax Act applies, 
according to which the dividends income and capital gains derived from equity 
participations are, except for 5% of the dividends and the gains, exempt from 
corporate tax.  
 
V. Entity classification  
As set out above, fiscally transparent and fiscally non-transparent entities are subject 
to different taxation rules. Entities may be classified as partnerships or corporations 
for tax purposes. Like Germany, many countries tax partnerships according to a 
                                                   
213 Jakob (note 148) 319. 
214 Previous s 3 No 40 Income Tax Act. 
215 Previous s 3c (2) Income Tax Act. 
216 Section 3 No 40 of the Income Tax Act. According to s 3 c (2) of the Income Tax Act only 60% of 
the expenditures are deductible. 
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single tax pattern.217 In contrast, corporations are commonly subject to a double tax 
pattern.218
In this respect the classification of a domestic and a foreign entity must be 
distinguished.  
 The entities treatment for tax purposes therefore generally depends on the 
countries` classification of the entity as partnership or corporation. 
In each case the point of departure constitute the German classification rules. 
 
1. Classification of domestic entities 
For German tax purposes domestic taxable entities are strictly defined in s 1 of the 
Corporate Tax Act, which enumerates domestic entity219 types to be considered as 
corporations and to be taxed accordingly. 220 Among other entity forms, the provision 
lists the public limited company, the limited liability company and the partnership 
limited by shares and includes others, like the European company.221 As the 
enumeration is final222 other entities are not considered corporations and therewith 
not subject to the double-tax pattern.223
The list is strictly based on the civil law organizations and therefore subject to a form 
over substance approach.
  
224 An entity formed under the Limited Liability Company 
Act, like the limited liability company can accordingly never be regarded as a 
partnership, and a partnership formed under the Commercial Code or the Civil Law 
Code can never be taxed as a corporation.225 For tax purposes the form takes insofar 
precedence over the substance of the business vehicle and even partnerships with 
corporate characteristics and conversely corporations with partnership characteristics 
are still to be classified according to their form of organization.226
                                                   
217 There are, however countries which tax partnerships according to a double tax pattern, as they treat 
partnerships like corporations for tax purposes. See footnote 193. 
 Hence, one man 
218 See in this study chapter C section IV.   
219 Entities which have their legal seat or place of effective management in Germany. See Frotscher 
(note 4) 171. 
220 See s 2 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act.  
221 Section 1 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act. 
222 Frotscher (note 4) 197. 
223 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.1.. 
224 The USA, France or Canada for instance. See Daniels (note 127) 16 and Brincker (note 154) 558-9. 
225 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.1.. 
226 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.1.. 
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entities227 are considered as a corporation and a compound entity228 treated as a 
partnership for German tax purposes.229
Considering the above, the German form over substance approach promotes 
predictability and certainty as to the tax treatment of a domestic entity, since the 
domestic or foreign investor
 
230 may choose an entity form and simultaneously 
predict its classification for tax purposes.231
The German classification of its domestic entity is nevertheless without prejudice to 
the foreign country`s classification.
 
232 The German entity may be classified and 
treated differently in a foreign country.233
In contrast to the German classification of domestic entities, other countries take the 
substance of business entities into consideration when classifying them for tax 
purposes
  
234 or even amending their legislation in order to provide for an election as 
to the entity`s tax classification.235 In the USA, for instance, the definition of 
corporations in its Corporate Tax Act was rather vague and hence allowed more 
room for the consideration of entities` specific features in order to classify them for 
domestic tax purposes.236 The USA focused on specific corporate features to 
distinguish partnerships from corporations and was insofar not confined to listed 
entities based on their Civil Law form.237
                                                   
227 A corporation which is wholly owned by one person. 
  
228 A partnership with corporate characteristics. Referred to as `GmbH&Co KG .´ See chapter C 
section II in this study. 
229 Jakob (note 148) 321. 
230 The classification rules apply also to domestic companies with foreign taxpayers as members. See 
Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 1.5.1.. 
231 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 1.5.1.. 
232 Where the investor of the entity resides, or the source of income is situated. See chapter C section 
V 2. In this study. 
233 For the discussion of such conflicts of qualification chapter C section VI in this study. 
234 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.1.. 
 Referred to as `Substance over form´ approach.  
235 See `check the box  ´regime, adopted by the USA. 
236 Daniels (note 127) 10-11. 
237 Daniels (note 127) 15, 17-23. Developed according to Kintner v United Sates, 216 F2d 418 (9th 
Cir.1954) and referred to as the `Kintner regulations .´ The Netherlands also classify their domestic 
entities according to specific features instead of relying on the form of the entity. 
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In order to simplify its legislation in this respect it adopted in 1997 the `check the 
box´ regime according to which the domestic entity is able to choose its tax 
status238.239
 
 
2. Classification of foreign entities. 
There are basically two different situations where foreign entities240
- if the owner of a foreign entity is a resident taxpayer in a classifying domestic 
country
 have to be 
classified from a domestic country perspective: 
241
- if the foreign entity receives income attributable to a source in the classifying 
domestic country. 
, and 
In these situations the fundamental question arises whether the foreign entity can be 
classified as a corporation subject to the double-tax pattern or as a partnership 
usually taxable under a single-tax pattern. 242
Countries` classification rules may be based on elaborated statutory provisions, on 
more or less developed case law, or on neither of these sources, leading to 
unpredictability and uncertainty from the taxpayer`s and tax authorities` point of 
view.
  
243
In some countries, like in Germany, `administrative guidance´ from countries` tax 
authorities or other governmental bodies are added to the basic rules in order to fill 
gaps relating to the classification process.
  
244
                                                   
238 Either as fiscally transparent or fiscally non-transparent corporation.  
 
239 Thies Kroniger `Anwendung des check the box-Systems auf die KGaA als Joint Venture-Vehikel  ´
(2002) 12 IStR 397 at 400; Barenfeld (note 27) 119. The `check the box  ´regime is also applicable to 
foreign entities. Insofar chapter C V 2. b) in this study. 
240 Entities with legal seat or place of effective management in a foreign country. See Frotscher (note 
4)171. 
241 This example corresponds to the `Outbound  ´and the `Inbound  ´situation discussed in chapter D in 
this study. 
242 Some countries treat partnerships like corporations and tax them according to a double-tax pattern. 
243 Barenfeld (note27) 108-111. 
244 Like the German Ministry of Finance circular of 24 December 1999 87-93. Quoted in Barenfeld 
(note 27) 110. 
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The methods pursued for the classification of foreign entities vary considerably 
between countries.245
However, the following three main methods may be distinguished, despite the 
varying details and criteria used within each of these.
  
246
 
 
a) Similarity Approach 
The Similarity approach is generally based on a `resemblance´ test requiring the 
examination of a foreign entity`s features and the comparison of these features with 
the characteristics of domestic business types.247 The tax treatment applicable to the 
domestic business type most similar to the foreign entity is then applied to the 
foreign entity for domestic tax purposes.248
Like in many other countries
 
249 this approach is also pursued by Germany.250
In this respect German legislation, however, lacks statutory provisions. 
  
251
Section 1 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act that provides for a strict definition of 
corporations for German tax purposes is confined to entities organized under 
domestic law
 
252 and neither German tax law nor any German DTC contains 
expressed rules regarding the classification of entities organized under foreign 
law.253
The German similarity approach is nevertheless based on domestic case law and 
insofar particularly on the `Venezuelan case´
  
254
                                                   
245 Daniels (note 127) 99; Frotscher (note 4) 171. 
 whose developed principles and 
246 Barenfeld (note 27) 111. 
247 Barenfeld (note 27) 112. 
248 Barenfeld (27) 112. 
249 For instance England and Sweden. See Barenfeld (27) 112. 
250 Referred to as `Typenvergleich i´n Germany. See Frotscher 172; Marion Müller and Clemens 
Wangler `Qualifikationskonflikte bei der Beteiligung inländischer Investoren an ausländischen 
Personengesellschaften  ´(2003) 5 IStR 145 at 146. 
251 Frotscher (note 4) 197. 
252 S 1 (1) of the German Corporate Tax Act. 
253 Frotscher (note 4) 197. 
254 RFH 2.2.1930 RStBl. 1930 444. Quoted in Barenfeld (note 27) 112.  
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rules are applicable law until today and accordingly recognized and followed by the 
German jurisdiction, the fiscal authorities and legal scholars.255
This case dealt with the classification of a Venezuelan limited partnership which was 
treated as a taxable entity under its local law. The court found that its legal features 
correspond to the legal characteristics of a German limited partnership and must 
accordingly be treated as a partnership and therewith fiscally transparent for German 
tax purposes. 
 
The question is therefore, whether the foreign entity, according to its features and its 
economic function attributed in the foreign country, more resembles a German 
corporation256 or a German partnership.257 For German tax purposes the entity is then 
treated either as a taxable corporation or as a fiscally transparent partnership, as the 
case may be. The German similarity method can therefore be summarized as 
referring to the legal features of a foreign entity comparing them to the domestic 
legal features of German entities and then applying the tax treatment applicable to 
the entity most resembling the foreign entity under examination.258
The American Limited Liability Company (LLC) may accordingly, depending on its 
design and German counterpart, constitute a partnership or a corporation for German 
tax purposes.
 
259
The tax treatment of the foreign entity in its home country is in this respect of no 
relevance for the German classification.
  
260
By the same token, elections as to the tax treatment in the foreign country cannot be 
taken into account.
  
261
Following the above example, an American LLC would therefore still be classified 
according to its German counterpart even if the taxpayer wanted it to be treated as a 
corporation in the USA
  
262
                                                   
255 Frotscher (note 4) 172, 198. 
. 
256 Frotscher (note 4) 198-199.  
257 Frotscher (note 4) 198. 
258 Müller and Wangler (note 250) at 146. 
259 Frotscher (note 4) 172. 
260 Daniels (note 127) 104; Barenfeld (note 27) chapter 8. The Swedish similarity approach considers 
the tax law characteristics of the foreign entity at least as one of the factors when classifying it for 
domestic tax purposes. 
261 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.2.. 
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As indicated above the general law, as opposed to the tax law characteristics of the 
foreign entity constitute the point of departure for classifying it for domestic tax 
purposes.263
Typical for partnerships is insofar that at least one of the partners has unlimited 
liability
 
264, that the management is carried out by the partners themselves, that the 
partnership may be subject to termination upon death or withdrawal of a partner and 
that the ownership is not transferable.265
A corporation, in contrast, usually features limited liability, a management carried 
out by non-members, indefinite existence and freely transferable ownership.
 
266 
Moreover it is regarded as legal entity with legal capacity separate from its members 
and should thus perform accordingly in its home country.267
In view of these main characteristics the German public limited company and the 
general partnership may be regarded as representing the decisive elements of a 
corporation and a partnership respectively and may insofar be taken into account as a 
point of departure when characterizing foreign entities for German tax purposes.
 
268
Considering the features of the general partnerships from Hong Kong, Ireland, 
Canada, Nigeria, USA and the unlimited company from South Africa, these foreign 
entities directly conform to the German general partnership (OHG).
 
269
However, strict conformity of a foreign entity with the features of a German entity 
type can be achieved only in rare cases.
  
270 The similarity approach therefore only 
requires conformity to the greatest extent possible.271
The countries` domestic entities and their features to be considered in the 
classification process may vary between countries.
 
272
                                                                                                                                                
262 According to the American `check-the-box  ´regime. 
 As the similarity approach is 
263 Barenfeld (note 27) 113. 
264 Daniels (note 127) 104.    
265 Frotscher (note 4) 198; see also chapter C section II in this study.    
266 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.2.; Daniels (note 127) 104; Frotscher (note 4) 198. 
267 Frotscher (note 4) 198. 
268 Daniels (note 127) 103. 
269 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 1. b). 
270 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 1. a) (1).  
271 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 1. a) (1). 
272 Barenfeld (note 27) 112. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
43 
 
based on a comparison between these features it may easily result in an entity being 
regarded as non-transparent corporation according to the foreign country`s 
perspective and as fiscally transparent for domestic tax purposes, hence in a conflict 
of qualification.273 By the same token, the method as such may also be applied 
differently by different countries and can therefore lead to different results with 
respect to the same foreign entity, depending on the country applying the similarity 
approach.274 These issues especially arise with regard to partnerships, as their general 
law features and their tax treatment vary to a great extent between countries` 
jurisdictions.275
As the similarity approach requires knowledge of foreign law and results only in rare 
cases in strict conformity with domestic entity types it may, particularly in borderline 
cases
  
276, be difficult to apply the approach in practice which may insofar give rise to 
some uncertainty and unpredictability in the classification process from the 
taxpayer`s and the fiscal administration`s point of view.277
In order to allow for a consistent classification of foreign entities also in more 
difficult cases the German tax administration therefore made up and released a list 
which aims at allocating foreign entities to domestic entity types with similar 
features. 
  
278  The tax administration updates this list regularly by also including 
newly introduced entity types.279 Similar efforts are made by the OECD which 
released an overview of the features and tax treatment of the member states` 
entities.280 These guidelines may be of assistance for taxpayers or fiscal 
administrations when determining the tax treatment of foreign entities for domestic 
tax law purposes and increasing certainty and predictability in this regard.281
                                                   
273 See chapter C section VI and chapter D in this study.  
  
274 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 1. b). For example, Belgium considers `legal personality  ´as a 
main feature of a domestic corporation and accordingly considers the same feature to be determinative 
as to whether the foreign entity constitutes a corporation for domestic tax purposes. In contrast, 
Sweden focuses on `legal capacity  ´as the decisive feature for classifying a foreign entity as 
corporation subject to the double-tax pattern. See Barenfeld (note 27) 112-113. 
275 Barenfeld (note 27) 112.  
276 For instance cases, where the entity features both corporate and partnership characteristics. 
277 Daniels (note 127) 104; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 147. 
278 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 147.  
279 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.1.2.. 
280 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 147. 
281 Barenfeld (note 27) 110. 
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The level of certainty and predictability for tax purposes is therefore dependant on 
the clarity of rules and principles developed by the domestic legislation or 
jurisdiction. 
 
b) Elective Approach 
Other countries pursue an approach, which basically allows the taxpayer to decide 
whether the entity shall be classified as a fiscally transparent partnership or as a 
taxable corporation for domestic tax purposes.282
This approach can best be illustrated by the American `check the box´ regime 
adopted by the USA in 1997.
                                                                          
283 The determination of how to characterize a foreign 
entity for U.S. tax purposes was previously based on a somewhat subjective four-
factor corporate resemblance test and has been rather a confused area of U.S. tax 
law.284 Therefore, in order to provide for more simplicity and certainty in this respect 
the USA introduced the elective regime as a new classification regulation.285
The new American `check-the-box´ regime which generally applies to domestic as 
well as foreign entities
                                                                                       
286, allows certain business entities to elect their classification 
for US tax purposes.287 The power to decide as to the classification of the entity is 
accordingly handed over to the taxpayer288 and may result in a classification as 
partnership, as disregarded entity (`branch´289) or corporation (`association´290).291
Partnerships and disregarded entities are both ignored for US tax purposes and 
accordingly treated as fiscally transparent.
                                                                                             
292 The corporation, in contrast, is 
considered a taxable entity.293
                                                   
282 Köhler Konzernsteuerrecht 2ed (2008) § 8 Konzernstruktur und Umstrukturierung margin number 
72-73. 
 Insofar the system resembles the German tax 
283 Kroniger (note 239) 400. 
284 See Daniels (note 127) for a detailed discussion 10-15; See also Kroniger (note 239) 400. 
285 Kroniger (note 239) 400. 
286 Barenfeld (note 27) 119. 
287 Jacobs (note 164) chapter 3 1.. 
288 Barenfeld (note 27) 119. 
289 Kroniger (note 239) 401. 
290 This term used for corporations in the US legislation. See Kroniger (note 239) 401. 
291 Kroniger (note 239) 401. 
292 Kroniger (note 239) 400. 
293 Kroniger (note 239) 400. 
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classification.294                                                                                                                  
However, the basic right to elect does only apply to `eligible entities´295, ie entities 
constituting a `separate business entity´ and not regarded as `per se´-corporations.                                                                                                                               
A `separate business entity´ may be assumed if the participants` association is based 
on a contractual agreement and aimed at carrying out business or financial activities 
or if the association constitutes a joint venture aiming at sharing profits. 296 
Associations which only aim at the sharing of costs or pure property administration 
do not satisfy these requirements297
Per se - corporations
 and are therefore not subject to the election 
provided for by the `check-the box´ regime.                                                                                                                          
298 are entity types which are required to be treated as 
corporations and may either be American entities organized as corporations 
according to the US federal or state law299 or foreign corporation types referred to in 
a list integrated in the US legislation300 . The List considers about 80 foreign entities, 
representing 80 countries301 and includes for instance, the United Kingdom Public 
Limited Company, the French Societe Anonyme and the German Public limited 
company.302 It does, however, not include the German Limited Liability Company 
which is regarded as corporation in Germany just like the included Public limited 
Company.303
                                                   
294 See in this study chapter C section III. 
 Accordingly the list may be regarded as rather limited to the main 
corporation types in each country treated as taxable entities according to their 
domestic tax law.  
295 Kroniger (note 239) 401. 
296 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(2). 
297 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2). 
298 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), -3(a). 
299 Jacobs (note 164) chapter 1 1.; Barenfeld (note 27) 119; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) 
bis (6) in conjunction with section 7704 IRC. 
300 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). 
301 In certain countries like Canada, Mexiko, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Jamaica, India and Malaysia there 
are however also clarifications regarding further entity types. See Treas. Reg. s 301.7701-2(b)(8)(ii), 
(iii), (iv)). 
302 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8)(i). 
303 Jacobs (note 164) chapter 1 1.. 
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In case the taxpayer fails to utilize the check-the box system, a `default 
classification´ takes place, based on the number of owners and the status of their 
liability.304
The relevance of the American check the box system for German tax purposes is 
obvious, considering cases of a German resident participating in an American entity 
or an American resident investing in a German entity.
  
305
Only recently the German BFH in fact dealt with one of these cases and had to 
determine the income of a German individual who participated in a US-Limited 
Liability Company (LLC) chosen to be classified as a partnership for US tax 
purposes. 
                                                                                                                  
306 The LLC was, however, held to be regarded as corporation under 
German tax law, which resulted in a conflict of qualification between the states 
involved. 307
The elective approach simplifies the classification process by relieving the tax 
administration from doing research and gathering knowledge about foreign 
entities.
  
308 Insofar the approach leads to certainty as to the tax consequences, which 
in turn makes the outcome more predictable for both the taxpayers and the tax 
administration.309                                                                                                          
However, the power of choosing the entity`s tax treatment entails great flexibility 
from a tax planning point of view and may, as experienced in the USA310, also be 
used by taxpayers for extensive tax avoidance through the use of hybrid entities311.312
                                                   
304 Treas. Reg. S. 301.7701-3(b). 
 
The prevention of such negative effects requires the adoption of strict and probably 
complex rules and would insofar counteract the actual simplicity of the check the box 
305 Jacobs (note 164) chapter 3 1.. See insofar also the `Inbound  ´and `Outbound  ´situation, discussed 
in chapter D in this study. 
306 Gero Burwitz `Einkünfte aus Beteiligung an US – LLC  ´(2008) 23 Neue Zeitschrift für 
Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 903 at 903. 
307 Burwitz (note 306) 903. For qualification conflicts see chapter C VI and chapter D in this study. In 
the examples discussed in chapter D the foreign entity is however regarded as fiscally transparent 
partnership for German tax purposes. The reverse case is not further dealt with in this study.  
308 Jacobs (note 148) chapter 3 1.; Barenfeld (note 27) 121. 
309 Barenfeld (note 27) 121. 
310 Barenfeld (note 27) 121-122. 
311 Jacobs (note 148) part 6 chapter 7 B. VII. Hybrid entities are entities classified differently for tax 
purposes in different countries and are the result of qualification conflicts. See insofar also chapter C 
section VI and chapter D in this study. 
312 Jacobs (note 148) chapter 3 1.. 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
47 
 
regime.313 As regards to the USA, it remains to be seen whether and how it will 
tighten its `check the box´ legislation in this respect.314
 
     
 
c) Fixed Approach 
Finally some countries pursue a fixed approach when classifying foreign entities.  
Accordingly all foreign entities are classified for tax purposes in the same way, either 
as fiscally transparent or as taxable corporate entity.315 Italy and Finland, for 
instance, characterize foreign companies and entities of any type as corporations and 
treat them accordingly as taxable entities for their domestic tax purposes.316
As this approach is based on the same treatment of foreign entities in each case it 
facilitates predictability and certainty as to the tax treatment, particularly for 
taxpayers who consider an investment in a foreign entity.
                       
317 By the same token it 
provides for simplicity from a tax administration`s point of view as the approach 
only requires compliance with the fixed treatment of foreign entities without 
involving the collection of legal information about the foreign entity form.318 On the 
other hand the approach makes no effort to consider the features of the foreign entity 
which increases the chances of a classification diverging from the foreign country.319
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
  
VI. Origin of qualification conflicts  
In general a qualification conflict refers to a situation where identical facts are treated 
differently for tax purposes in different countries.320 Such a conflict may either 
concern the subject 321 or the object of taxation322.323
                                                   
313 Barenfeld (note 27) 121-123. 
  
314 Jacobs (note 148) chapter 3 1.. 
315 Barenfeld (note 27) 123. 
316 Brincker (154) 559 and 560; Rijkele (note 137) Italy-Partnerships 5.1.. 
317 Barenfeld (note 27) 124. 
318 Barenfeld (note 27) 124. 
319 Barenfeld (note 27) 124. See insofar also chapter C section VI in this study. 
320 Jacobs (note 164) chapter 7 A. 
321 Helmut Debatin `Zur Behandlung von Beteiligungen an Personengesellschaften unter den 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen im Lichte der neueren Rechtsprechung des Bundesfinanzhofs  ´(1992)  
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As regards to the object of taxation, two or more countries may classify income 
derived by a domestic partner from a foreign partnership differently despite the 
common classification of the entity itself.324
However, focus of this study is a `subject divergence conflict´, where the same entity 
is classified or treated `differently in two or more countries´
 
325. Entities regarded as 
corporation are themselves liable and subject to tax. Entities classified as partnership 
are, however, usually seen as fiscally transparent. Instead its partners are considered 
liable and subject to tax. Therefore, if countries classify the same entity differently, 
as non-transparent in one country and as fiscally transparent in the other country, 
they are in conflict regarding the subject of taxation.326 The same applies to entities, 
regarded in both countries as partnership but treated differently as non-transparent in 
one country and fiscally transparent in the other country.327
It is however still to be clarified what in fact gives rise to these conflicts regarding 
the tax classification of entities.  
  
Firstly, point of departure for classifying a domestic or foreign entity and 
determining its taxability always constitutes the domestic tax law of the respective 
classifying or taxing country usually without consideration of the entity`s tax 
                                                                                                                                                
Betriebs Berater (BB) 1181 at 1181. Referred to as `subject divergence conflict .´ See Stephan 
Gündisch `Solving Conflicts of Qualification by Analogous Application of Tax Treaties´IBFD (2003) 
Bulletin-Tax Treaty Monitor 424 at 426. Referred to as `subject divergence conflict .´ In Germany 
referred to as `subjektiver Qualifikationskonflikt .´ 
322 Referred to as `object divergence conflict .´ See Gündisch (note 321) at 426. In Germany referred to 
as `objektiver Qualifikationskonflikt .´ 
323 The OECD Partnership Report 1999 deals with both issues. The main part however focuses on 
qualification conflicts regarding the subject of taxation. See OECD Partnership Report (note 1) part II. 
324 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A. II. This constitutes a particular issue in Germany. According 
to German tax law guaranteed payments paid by the partnership and derived by a partner are always 
treated as business income falling under s 15 (1) No 2 of the German Income tax Act. Insofar Art 7 
generally applies for tax treaty purposes in cross-border situations. However, most countries treat 
guaranteed payments according to the nature of such payments. Interests paid by the partnership on 
loans provided by the partner are accordingly treated as interests and not as business profits. In a cross 
border situation the contracting countries might therefore apply different articles of a DTC with 
respect to the same income. This can affect the application of a DTC and give rise to double taxation 
or double non-taxation of the guaranteed payments. One part of the Partnership Report addressed this 
specific issue. Its analysis in this study would, however, extend what is possible to deal with. It is 
therefore not further analyzed.   
325 Barenfeld (note 27) 103. The entity resulting from such a conflict is referred to as `hybrid  ´entity. 
See footnote 311. This type of conflict is dealt with throughout this study and hereinafter referred to 
as `qualification conflict .´ 
326 Hans Gummert and Lutz Weipert Münchener Handbuch des Gesellschaftsrechts 2ed vol 2 (2004) 
§58 Ertragsteuern margin number 493.  
327 Frotscher (note 4) 170; Gummert and Weipert (note 326) margin number 494. 
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treatment in the foreign country.328 As indicated, the classification rules as such, vary 
considerably between countries.329
Some countries, like Germany, consider the civil form of domestic entities as 
decisive for its tax classification. Other countries rather focus on various general law 
features of the entity in order to determine its classification for tax purposes. Again 
other countries offer the domestic entity an election as to its tax classification.                                                                                   
                                                                                                                           
As regards the classification of foreign entities the countries also apply different 
methods. Insofar the similarity approach, the elective approach and the fixed 
approach can be distinguished.330
Neither the classification of domestic, nor the classification of foreign entities, 
however, considers the tax treatment of the entity in the foreign country. Therefore 
they may all give rise to qualification conflicts.
                                                                                                                            
331
As a result, the classification may lead to an entity regarded as partnership 
transparent for tax purposes in one country and as non-transparent corporation in the 
other country, hence in a conflict regarding the qualification of the subject of 
taxation. 
 The elective approach even 
facilitates the utilization of such conflicts by providing for an election as to the 
entity`s tax treatment irrespective of its treatment in the other country.     
A Chilean `sociedad de responsabilidad limitada´, for instance, although regarded as 
partnership in its country of organization, is not recognized as such in Germany, but 
rather considered a corporation when compared to the features of German entity 
types.332
By the same token, an American LLP will be treated as fiscally transparent for 
German tax purposes if it resembles a German partnership, although it might have 
elected to be treated as a non-transparent corporation in the United States.
  
333
                                                   
328 See the different classification methods in chapter C section V in this study; see also Frotscher 
(note 4) 171; An exception constitutes the Swedish similarity approach, as it considers at least to some 
extent also foreign tax characteristics. See Barenfeld (note 27) chapter 8.  
  
329 See chapter C section V in this study. 
330 See chapter C section V in this study. 
331 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.3.6.; Barenfeld (note 27) 117 
332 Jacobs (note 164) chapter 4 A. I. 1. b. 
333 Gündisch (note 321) 425. 
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Besides, partnerships` treatment for tax purposes334 also differs from country to 
country.335 In this respect the OECD Partnership Report therefore indicates, that the 
term partnership does not imply anything about its tax treatment.336 Some countries 
treat partnerships generally and irrespective of any election as corporation for tax 
purposes and insofar different from many other countries. 337 This potentially results 
in a conflict of qualification even if the entity is consistently classified as partnership 
in both countries.338
As the South American `sociedad colectivas´ (general partnership) and the `sociedad 
en comanditas´ (limited partnership), for instance, resemble the German partnership 
types, they are treated as fiscally transparent for German tax purposes, irrespective of 
their treatment as non-transparent corporations under the Chilean tax regime.
 
339
In short, a qualification conflict concerning the subject of taxation occurs when the 
same entity is treated as non-transparent in one country and transparent in the other 
country.
   
340 Facilitated is such a conflict, either if the same entity is classified 
differently or despite common classification treated differently for tax purposes in 
two or more countries. Contrary to corporations which are legally and fiscally treated 
more or less in the same manner by most of the countries, partnerships are not 
subject to such a consistent transnational concept.341 As indicated, their tax 
classification and their tax treatment vary considerably between countries` 
jurisdictions, and countries are insofar not obliged to follow the tax concept applied 
in the other contracting country.342
                                                   
334 Like its general law nature. 
  
335 See chapter C section III in this study. 
336 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) Introduction 7. 
337 Examples: sociedad colectiva (general partnership) and sociedad en comandita (limited 
partnership) according to the domestic tax law of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Spain. 
See Jacobs (note 164) chapter 4 A. I. 1. b.; see also footnote 193.     
338 Frotscher (note 4) 170; Brincker (note 154) 552.   
339 Jacobs (note 164) chapter 4 A. I. 1. b.. 
340 Frotscher (note 4) 170. Also referred to as `asymmetrical sitiuation .´ See Barenfeld (note 27) 3. 
341 Barenfeld (note 27) 3. In contrast to homogeneous companies (corporations) the partnership 
constitutes a heterogeneous business vehicle. 
342 Gündisch (note 321) 425; Frotscher (note 4) 171; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 145-146. 
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Therefore, partnerships are particularly vulnerable to the above form of qualification 
conflicts.343
 
   
 
D. Taxation of cross-border partnerships, a German perspective  
The following chapter deals with the various effects of a qualification conflict on the 
taxation of cross-border partnerships. In order to understand the specific tax issues 
involved it is necessary to give a short overview of the general taxing principles and 
provisions applied in cross-border situations. In section I it is therefore dealt with the 
general concepts in international taxation. Reference is insofar given to the specific 
German tax provisions dealing with these international tax concepts.                                                                                                                                    
The taxing principles with regard to the taxation of cross-border partnerships and the 
effects of qualification conflicts in this respect are subject to analysis in part II. The 
analysis is insofar based on two fixed scenarios, the `Outbound´ and the `Inbound´ 
investment of a partner. Germany is in both basic constellations involved, either as 
country, where the partnership has its legal seat or place of effective management 
(`partnership country´344), or as country, where the partner of the partnership resides 
(`partner country´345
 
). In order to reveal the actual tax effects of qualification 
conflicts, the fixed scenarios first deal with the general taxation of cross-border 
partnerships without qualification conflict and then proceed to address the taxation 
when a qualification conflict occurs. It is insofar also dealt with the different 
approaches aiming at solving the qualification conflict and its adverse tax effects. 
Focus are however the approaches developed by the OECD, their effectiveness and 
how they are followed by German tax authorities, legal scholars and jurisdiction.           
 
                                                   
343 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 145-146; Gummert and Weipert (note 326) §58 Ertragsteuern 
margin number 494; Barenfeld (note 27) 117.  
344 The country where the partnership has its legal seat or place of effective management is hereinafter 
referred to as `partnership country´. 
345 The country where the partner of the partnership resides is hereinafter referred to as `partner 
country .´ 
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I. General concepts in cross-border tax situations   
 
1. Double Taxation 
The term double taxation already implies that `the same income is taxed more than 
once´.346 Insofar two different types of double taxation, however, can be 
distinguished.347
Juridical double taxation generally refers to the situation where the same taxpayer is 
subject to comparable tax on the same income for identical periods in two or more 
states.
 
348
This type of double taxation is of international nature only and due to the countries` 
overlapping principles of taxation in a cross-border situation.
 
349 Insofar the principles 
of residence and the principle of source are of significance and applied by countries 
to justify their tax claims against domestic and foreign taxpayers. 350                                                                                                     
A person is generally subject to unlimited tax liability on his worldwide income in 
his country of residence.351 Worldwide income means insofar that the tax liability is 
not confined to the income produced in the domestic market but covers income 
produced all over the world regardless of its specific source.352
In Germany this principle is applied by s 1 (1) of the Income Tax Act for individuals 
and s 1 (1) Corporate Tax Act for corporations. Section 1 (1) of the Income Tax Act 
provides for unlimited tax liability of individuals if their residence or normal place of 
abode is within the German territory. 
                                                                 
353 Corporations must have their seat or 
effective place of management354
                                                   
346 Barenfeld (note 27) 84. 
 in Germany in order to become subject to 
347 Frotscher (note 4) 4-5. 
348 Frotscher (note 4) 4. 
349 Barenfeld (note 27) 84-85. 
350 Frotscher (note 4) 7. 
351 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 1 B. II. 1. (a) (1). Also referred to as the `worldwide income 
principle .´ This taxing principle can be distinguished from the principle of citizenship. According to 
that a person is liable to tax on his worldwide income due to his citizenship in a country and 
irrespective of its place of residence. This approach is applied by the USA. See Barenfeld (note 27) 85 
352 Frotscher (note 4) 7. 
353 Section 8 and 9 Internal Revenue Code. 
354 Section 10 and 11 Internal Revenue Code.  
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unlimited tax liability.355 Apart from other special provisions356
The principle of source on the other hand confines a country`s taxing rights on 
income produced within its territory yet regardless of where the person who 
generates this income resides.
 these are in Germany 
the main justifications for the taxation of a person`s worldwide income.   
357 In Germany this is provided by s 1 (4) in 
conjunction with s 49 (1) of the Income Tax Act according to which foreign358 
individuals are subject to limited tax liability on income received from sources 
within the German territory, specifically enumerated in s 49 (1).359 These sources 
feature a `genuine link´ to the German territory which aim at justifying the taxation 
of these sources as domestic source income.360 Such a link, for instance, exists if a 
foreign individual receives income attributable to a German permanent 
establishment. 361 According to s 2 No.1 Corporate Tax Act foreign362
Like Germany, countries do not confine their taxing rights to one principle of 
taxation, but usually pursue the principle of source and the principle of residence 
together in order to secure its tax revenue.
 corporations 
are equally subject to limited tax liability in Germany if they, like individuals derive 
income from a German source enumerated in s 49 (1) Income Tax Act. 
363
For example an individual resident in a foreign country and receiving income from a 
German permanent establishment may be subject to limited tax liability in Germany 
due his source of income and, provided the foreign country pursues the above 
 This may in a cross border situation, 
however, result in overlapping taxing rights of two or more countries and thus in the 
above issue of juridical double taxation. 
                                                   
355 Section 1 (1) Corporate Tax Act. 
356 Like s 1 (2), (3) or s 1 (a) of the Income Tax Act. 
357 Barenfeld (note 27) 85. 
358 If neither their residence nor their normal place of abode is in Germany. See s 1 (4) of the Income 
Tax Act. 
359 Section 2 of the German Foreign Tax Relations Act (in Germany referred to as 
`Außensteuergesetz´) is another more specific provision aiming at extending the tax liability for 
domestic source income. 
360 Frotscher (note 4) 110. 
361 See s 49 (1) No.2 (a) Income Tax Act. Referred to as concept of `permanent establishment´. See 
Frotscher (note 4) 242. This concept is also applied to cross-border partnerships. See insofar chapter D 
in this study. 
362 If neither their domestic seat nor their effective place of management is situated in Germany. See s 
2 (1) of the Corporate Tax Act. 
363 Lynette Olivier `Residence based taxation  ´(2001) TSAR 20 at 21; Barenfeld (note 27) 85. 
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principles364
As the principles themselves also vary in detail from country to country the same 
person may even be considered a resident and subject to unlimited taxation in both 
countries. 
,  due to his residence additionally subject to unlimited tax liability on 
the same income in the foreign country. 
In all these instances, international juridical double taxation occurs. The person is 
subject `to a more burdensome taxation than what is intended from a domestic 
perspective´365
Economic double taxation, as already indicated above, may be of domestic or 
international nature and may particularly in the countries` domestic tax systems even 
be intentionally adopted, for example, in context of the taxation of corporations and 
their respective shareholders (double-tax pattern).
.   
366 A corporation is insofar subject 
to some sort of corporate tax and the shareholder additionally subject to tax upon 
distribution of the companies` profits. Countries adopt specific tax systems in order 
to relieve the taxpayers from this sort of double taxation.  Considering the example of 
corporations, economic double taxation, however, means that two different persons 
are subject to tax367 which also constitutes the main difference to juridical double 
taxation.368
Apart from the example of a domestic corporation and its domestic shareholder 
economic double taxation could equally occur in a cross-border situation, where a 
foreign shareholder invests in a domestic corporation or conversely.
                                                                                                          
369
                                                   
364 South Africa, for instance, used to tax income according to the source principle only. However, it 
amended its Tax Act in this respect and adopted a residence principle in order to tax South African 
residents on their worldwide income. Besides, non-residents remain subject to tax on their South 
African source income. See Olivier (note 363) at 20.   
 This situation 
might become even more complex, if the countries classify the entity differently as 
Since 2001 residence and source principle are therefore also in South Africa applied equally and may 
accordingly lead to the issues, discussed above.    
365 Barenfeld (note 27) 102. 
366 See chapter C section IV in this study. 
367 In case of a corporation (or partnership treated as corporation), the entity itself is subject to 
corporate tax and the shareholder subject to tax upon distribution. 
368 Frotscher ( note 4) 4-6. 
369 Barenfeld (note 27) 86. 
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non-transparent subject to the double-tax pattern in one country and as fiscally 
transparent partnership subject to the single-tax pattern in the other country.370
 
     
2. Double tax relief 
A country extending its taxing rights to the worldwide income of a person goes 
beyond its territory and constitutes therefore the main reason for international 
juridical double taxation, as its tax claim basically facilitates the overlapping of 
taxing rights.371 Accordingly it is normally upon the country of residence to relief the 
taxpayer from double taxation in a cross-border situation.372 Countries have adopted 
different unilateral rules in their domestic tax systems.373 Additionally countries 
agreed on bilateral374 rules according to different DTCs entered into with other 
countries.375
Whether unilaterally or bilaterally adopted, one can generally distinguish between 
three main means to relief income from juridical double taxation.  
  
One of these means constitutes the exemption method, which assigns the taxing 
rights to one country exclusively376, by exempting the income in the other country377 
from tax.378 Some countries, however, include the exempted income in the tax base 
in order to consider it when computing the tax rate in their progressive tax system.379
According to the credit method both, the country of residence and the country of 
source include the same income of the respective taxpayer in its tax base in order to 
compute its tax rate.
  
380
                                                   
370 See in this study chapter D section II. 
 However, usually by the residence country, the taxpayer is 
subsequently granted a `credit for the tax paid in the source country against the 
371 Frotscher (note 4) 7. If all countries would only pursue the source principle an overlapping of 
taxing right was impossible. International juridical double taxation would then not occur.  
372 Jakob (note 148) 394. 
373 See s 34 Income Tax Act. See for details footnote 384. 
374 For examples of multilateral DTCs see para 37-40 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. 
375 Frotscher (note 4) 8. 
376 Typically the country of source. 
377 Usually the country of residence. 
378 Jakob (note 148) 403 
379 See art 23 A (3) OECD MTC; Art 23 para 14 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC. Also 
referred to as `exemption with progression .´ 
380 Jakob (note 148) 403. 
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domestic tax´381. Insofar some countries adopt a method which confines the credit to 
the tax paid in the domestic country and denies a credit for the foreign tax amount 
exceeding the domestic tax amount allocable to the foreign income.382
The deduction method, finally, allows the taxpayer to deduct the tax amount paid in 
the foreign country from its domestic tax base like deductible expenses.
                                                                                                    
383
As indicated in the introduction, this study is confined to bilateral methods for the 
relief of double taxation, ie to the provisions of the OECD MTC.
  
384
Germany has negotiated about 90 DTCs
  
385 aiming at the elimination of international 
double taxation of income or gains386 arising in one territory and paid to residents of 
another territory.387 DTCs are international contracts between two or more countries, 
which become in Germany applicable domestic law by approval according to art 59 
(2) of the German Constitution.388 These international contracts are to be regarded as 
`lex specialis´, prevailing over the more general domestic tax provisions389
                                                   
381 Barenfeld (note 27) 87. 
, as 
indicated by s 2 Internal Revenue Code and resulting from the common rules for the 
382 Barenfeld (note 27) 87. Also referred to as `ordinary credit method  ´in contrast to a `full credit 
method  ´according to which the amount exceeding the domestic tax amount is equally creditable. 
383 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.3.5.3.. 
 Adopted in Germany unilaterally. However, not dealt with in the OECD MTC. 
384 Unilaterally the exemption method is not available in Germany. Instead the credit method 
constitutes the main method to relieve resident taxpayers from double taxation. According to s 34 c of 
the Income Tax Act384 a resident taxpayer, subject to unlimited tax liability in Germany, who is also 
subject to comparable tax in a foreign country on income originating in that country, is allowed to 
credit the paid foreign tax against the domestic tax going on the income of that country. In short, `the 
amount of creditable foreign tax is limited to the amount of domestic tax allocable to the foreign-
source income´384 and denied as far as the levied foreign tax exceeds the domestic tax amount.384 
Furthermore, the taxpayer is only eligible of taking advantage of the credit if he produces income in 
terms of s 34 d Income Tax Act. However, the credit method is not applicable, if the income is derived 
by a corporation from a foreign corporation. Section 8 b Corporate Tax Act then exempts 95% of the 
dividend income from tax. This is in Germany, nevertheless, not regarded as exemption method in the 
above sense. As an alternative to the above credit method the taxpayer may also choose the deduction 
method as means to eliminate the double taxation of his income.384 According to s 34 c (2) and (3) 
Income Tax Act384 the taxpayer is on request or upon presence of specific circumstances allowed to 
deduct the foreign taxes from its German tax base in order to reduce its domestic tax rate, and thereby 
compensating the double taxation. See Frotscher (note 4) 85-100. 
385 Frotscher (note 4) 22. 
386 Capital gains are not dealt with in this study.  
387 Para 1-3 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. 
388 Frotscher (note 4) 24. 
389 Jakob (note 148) 399.  
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application of tax laws.390 Existing DTCs therefore to a great extent replace the 
domestic relief method.391
The following structure of the OECD MTC aims at giving a short overview of tax 
treaties following the Model Tax Convention. The structure is accordingly limited to 
its main provisions. It may be regarded as the basic order of examination when 
applying a DTC to a cross-border situation and is in a modified form also used for 
the second section of this chapter.  
    
   
a) Factual and personal scope of the OECD MTC  
According to art 1 of the MTC the Convention covers income and capital gains tax 
levied by the Contracting countries (factual scope).392
Article 1, 3 and 4 regulate the entitlement to the Convention (personal scope).
  
393
 
 
According to art 1 the Convention applies to persons resident in at least one of the 
contracting countries. The entitlement to the Convention benefits depends 
accordingly on whether the taxpayer is a person in terms of art 3 (1) (a) and whether 
he can be regarded as a resident according to art 4. 
b) Distributive rules and methods for elimination of double taxation  
It has to be considered that DTCs are not able to establish taxing rights in favor of 
the contracting countries.394 The determination of the taxability of the income takes 
place under the domestic law of these countries prior to any consideration of a DTC 
and follows the international tax principles set out above.395 The DTC, if negotiated 
between the countries, may only apply subsequently to distribute or restrict these 
taxing rights already established and claimed by each country under their domestic 
tax law.396
                                                   
390 Frotscher (note4) 26. Principle of `lex specialis derogat legi generali .´ 
  
391 See s 34 c (6) Income Tax Act. For the domestic credit method in Germany see footnote 384. 
392 Jakob (note 148) 401. 
393 Jakob (note 148) 401; Frotscher (note 4) 111. 
394 Frotscher (note 4)100. 
395 Jakob (note 148) 401. See in this study chapter D section I 1. for the principles of taxation. 
396 Jakob (note 148) 401. 
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To what extent the countries` rights to tax are maintainable or to be limited is 
dependent on the type of income and insofar determined by the main part of the 
OECD MTC.397 With respect to each type of income it is distinguished between the 
resident state and the source state.398 Resident state is generally the state where the 
taxpayer who derives income from a foreign State resides and source state refers to 
the state where the taxpayer produces the income subject to tax in that state.399
Articles 6-22 aim at arranging the taxing rights of these states with regard to 
income
                                                                        
400 or capital. These distributive rules mainly address the taxation in the 
source state and may, depending on the applicable provisions, result in the source 
state`s taxing right being maintained401, being restricted402, being precluded403 or 
being limited to a certain amount404.405  Where the taxing rights of both states 
maintain to a certain extent after application of the distributive rules, the provisions 
refer to art 23 in order to eliminate the then existent double taxation of the same 
income.406 Insofar it is upon the residence state of the taxpayer to apply art 23.407 
There is, however, no need to apply Art 23, where the distributive rules confer the 
right to tax on one of the contracting countries only and therewith avoid double 
taxation without application of any further articles.408
According to art 6, for example, income from immovable property situated in one 
Contracting State and derived from a resident in the other Contracting State may also 
be taxed by the first State. Insofar both, the country of source and the country of 
 
                                                   
397 Alexander Rust `The New Approach to Qualification Conflicts has its Limits  ´(2003) Bulletin-Tax 
Monitor 45 at 45 and 46. 
398 Debatin (note 321) at 1181. 
399 Debatin (note 321) at 1181; see also art 4 of the OECD MTC. 
400 See art 6-21 of the OECD MTC. The following in this study refers to income only. 
401 For instance Art 6 OECD MTC, according to which income from immovable property may be 
taxed in the source state without any restriction. 
402 For instance Art 7 OECD MTC, according to which the source state may only tax the income 
attributable to a permanent establishment situated in its state. 
403 According to Art 21 only the residence state is allowed to tax other income. 
404 For instance dividends according to Art 10, which provides that the source state must limit its 
taxation to a certain amount. 
405 See para. 21-4 of the introduction to the OECD MTC; Debatin (note 321) 1181. 
406 See para. 25 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. Referred to as `open distributive rules´, which 
have to be read with Art 23 OECD MTC. Rust (note 397) at 46. 
407 Para. 25 of the introduction to the OECD MTC; see also wording of Art 23 A and B of the OECD 
MTC; Rust (note 397) at 46. 
408 Para. 24 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. Referred to as `complete distributive rules´. See 
Rust (note 397) 47. 
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residence are allowed to tax the income which may only be avoided by application of 
art 23 A or B.409
According to art 7, on the other hand, business profits of an enterprise of a 
contracting state are taxable `only´ in that state, unless the same enterprise carries on 
its business through a permanent establishment in the other contracting state. 
Provided there is no permanent establishment in the source state, the right to tax is 
exclusively conferred on the residence state of the enterprise. By the term `only´ it is 
implied that the source State has to waive its right to tax.
    
410 Double taxation is 
therefore avoided without further reference to Art 23 A or B.411
As indicated above, article 23 comes into operation where art 6-22 maintain the right 
to tax in both contracting states. Article 23 is addressed to the state of residence and 
provides for two different methods aiming at the elimination of double taxation.
       
412
According to art 23 A (1) of the OECD MTC the income may be relieved from 
double taxation by being completely exempted from tax in the state of residence.
 
413 
The resident State may however consider the exempted income and include it in the 
taxpayer`s tax base when calculating and determining the tax amount on the 
remaining domestic income which usually leads to a higher tax rate in a progressive 
tax system.414 As regards Germany, this concept is introduced in its domestic tax law 
by s 32b (1) No 3 of the Income Tax Act.415
Alternatively the state of residence may allow a credit amounting to the tax paid in 
the State of source, stipulated in art 23 B of the OECD MTC.
        
416 Many negotiated 
DTCs do not contain any rules regarding the implementation of this rule and refer 
therefore in this respect to the relevant domestic rules.417
                                                   
409 Frotscher (note 4) 116. 
 In Germany this is carried 
410 Frotscher (note 4) 116. 
411 Jakob (note 148) 402. 
412 Para. 25 of the introduction to the OECD MTC; Rust (note 397) 46. 
413 Para. 25 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. Referred to as `Exemption method .´ 
414 See art 23 A (3) OECD MTC; Art 23 para. 14 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC. Also 
referred to as `exemption with progression .´ 
415 Frotscher (note 4) 89. 
416 Para. 25 of the introduction to the OECD MTC. Referred to as `Credit method .´ 
417 Frotscher (note 4) 96. 
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out by s 34 c (6) sentence 2 of the Income Tax Act, which renders its implementation 
rules applicable as far as the credit method of a German DTC is concerned.418
As indicated by the OECD Commentary, Art 23 is generally based on the concept of 
juridical double taxation.
  
419 In the examples discussed in part II however double 
taxation does not completely comply with this concept due to the conflict of 
qualification between the contracting countries.420
 
 To be clarified is insofar whether 
Art 23 nevertheless applies in these situations. 
    
II. Taxation of cross-border partnerships                                                     
As it was shown in the previous chapter, partnerships` classification, as well as their 
treatment for tax purposes, vary considerably between countries` jurisdictions. Due 
to their heterogeneity partnerships are therefore particularly vulnerable to conflicts 
regarding their qualification for tax purposes.                                                                                                
The different effects of this conflict with regard to cross-border partnerships are 
subject to examination in this part of the study. As will be illustrated on the basis of 
certain examples the different classification and tax treatment of the partnership in 
the partner country, the partnership country and the country where the source is 
situated (`source country´)421 may easily lead to double taxation.422
                                                   
418 Frotscher (note 4) 96. 
 However 
questionable is, whether the application of the OECD MTC succeeds in relieving 
these situations from that excessive taxation. Of particular relevance are in this 
context the entitlement of partnerships to the benefits of the OECD MTC and the 
availability of its tax relief rules, both in case of a conflict of qualification between 
the contracting states. 
419 Art 23 A and B para. 1-2 of the Commentary on the OECD MTC; for the definition of the term 
`juridical double taxation  ´see in this study chapter D section I 1. 
420 See in this study chapter D section II 1. b) bb) (2) (2.1). 
421 If different from the partner country or the partnership country. Hereinafter referred to as the 
source country. In the analyzed examples the source is situated in the partnership country.  
422 Frotscher (note 4) 170. 
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In order to keep the study in a structured manner, it is carried out by way of certain 
examples which aim at identifying and elaborating the main problems concerning 
cross-border partnerships and the conflicts relating to their classification for tax 
purposes.                                                      
The examples aim at illustrating the taxation of cross border partnerships as it would 
be without any qualification conflict. Subsequently, the same examples are used to 
demonstrate how the usual taxation is effected by the occurrence of a qualification 
conflict between the respective countries.                                                                              
Generally, endless different tax situations and issues are conceivable with respect to 
partnerships operating cross-border.423 The analysis is therefore confined to fixed 
scenarios where certain tax features are assumed in order to direct the focus onto the 
main tax issues relating to qualification conflicts. The following basic conflicts can 
in general be distinguished424
1. A partnership is regarded as non-transparent in the partnership country, but 
classified as transparent in the partner country. 
: 
2. In the partnership country the partnership is classified as transparent, however, it is 
regarded as non-transparent in the partner country. 
The examples, used for the analysis at hand, are accordingly divided into two main 
situations, namely the `Outbound´ and the `Inbound´ investment by a partner. In the 
first situation a partner, resident in Germany (partner country), invests in a 
partnership organized in a foreign country (partnership country). The latter situation, 
on the contrary, refers to a partner, who is resident in a foreign country (partner 
country) and investing in a partnership organized in Germany (partnership country). 
In both cases the partnership is carrying out a business 425
                                                   
423 Especially if a third country is involved (`triangular situation´). 
 through a permanent 
establishment in its state of organization. The income in question is in both situations 
attributable to the permanent establishment. 
424 Barenfeld (note 27) 130; Daniels (127) 54. 
425 As indicated above under chapter C section III 2. a partnership may at least according to German 
tax law also carry out other activities. However, for the purposes of this study it is assumed that the 
partnership carries out a business. 
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It is assumed that the contracting countries entered into a DTC, based on the 
provisions of the OECD MTC.   
As indicated, a DTC cannot establish taxing rights in favor of the contracting 
countries. As the countries` domestic tax law is not subject to examination in this 
study, these domestically established taxing rights regarding the income of the 
partnership are assumed and based on either the source principle or the residence 
principle, depending on the facts of each case and on the country claiming the right 
to tax.426
The different tax issues are dealt with from a German perspective. Its classification 
and tax treatment of domestic and foreign partnerships and their partners constitutes 
therefore a point of departure in the examples.                                                                                                                     
   
As discussed in the previous part, Germany considers domestic partnerships as 
transparent for tax purposes.                                                                                                   
With respect to entities organized in a foreign country, Germany applies the 
similarity approach in order to determine whether the foreign entity can be regarded 
as a fiscally transparent partnership or as a non-transparent corporation for domestic 
tax purposes. It is insofar assumed that Germany classifies the foreign entity as a 
fiscally transparent partnership, irrespective of its tax treatment in the foreign 
country.                                                                                                                                        
The foreign country treats its domestic and the German partnership either the same 
way427 as Germany or differently428
By taking into account these assumptions, the following situations are analyzed. 
 for domestic tax purposes.                                                                                                                                 
  
 
 
 
                                                   
426 For the principles see in this study chapter D section I. 
427 See in this study chapter D section II 1. a) and 2. a). 
428 See in this study chapter D section II 1. b) and 2. b). 
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1. German partner/foreign partnership (`Outbound´) 
An individual429
 
 is resident in Germany and derives as partner (P) income from a 
foreign partnership (PS). The partnership carries on business through a permanent 
establishment (PE), situated in the foreign partnership country.  
a) Taxation if both countries apply the transparency approach 
In general, when analyzing the taxation of cross-border partnerships it must be 
distinguished between the situation in the partnership country and the situation in the 
partner country. 
 
aa) Taxation in the foreign partnership country (source country430
(1) Entitlement to the Convention benefits 
) 
Bilateral tax treaties only `apply to persons who are resident in one or both of the 
contracting states.´431
Article 3(a) of the OECD MTC defines the term `person´ as including an individual, 
a company and any other body of persons. According to the OECD Partnership 
Report and the amended Commentary a partnership is to be regarded as a person 
under the Convention either because it is covered by the definition of a company or 
because it constitutes a body of persons.
 Considering that provision as a point of departure, it has to be 
examined whether the foreign partnership fulfills these requirements and may as such 
be entitled to the benefits of the Convention.  
432 Companies are insofar to be regarded as 
juridical persons or any other entity treated as juridical person for tax purposes433
                                                   
429 Imaginable is also a corporation as partner of a partnership. The additional analysis of such 
situations would make the study, however too extensive. Therefore the analysis is confined to 
individuals as partners.  
. 
Under the transparency approach a partnership is considered fiscally transparent and 
430 The partnership country also constitutes the source country, as the income is attributable to a 
permanent establishment situated therein. 
431 See Art 1 of the OECD MTC. 
432 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 12; art 3 para 2 of the OECD Commentary on the OECD MTC; 
see also Michael Lang (note 47) 31-32.  
433 Article 3(1)(b) OECD MTC. 
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therefore not covered by this definition for the purpose of the convention.434 
However, irrespective of the partnership`s treatment for tax purposes in the 
respective states, it is at least to be regarded as a body of persons and hence as a 
person in terms of the Convention.435
However, in order to qualify as a person covered by the Convention a partnership 
must also qualify as a resident of one or both of the contracting states.
 
436
According to art 4 the term resident is defined as: 
                                                               
`…any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of 
his domicile, place of management or any other criterion of similar nature. But this 
term does not include any person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of 
income from sources in that State or capital situated therein.´   
A partnership may therefore be regarded as a resident if it is liable to tax by reason of 
its domicile, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature in at least 
one of the contracting States. It should accordingly be subject to unlimited tax 
liability according to the worldwide income principle.437
As discussed above some countries treat partnership as corporations, subject to tax as 
such. Insofar the partnership qualifies as a resident in the country of its seat or place 
of effective management, as it is subject to unlimited taxation on its worldwide 
income therein.
                                                                                                                               
438
Other countries, on the contrary, treat partnerships as fiscally transparent and tax 
only the partners on their share of the partnership income.
                                                                                                                              
439 According to the tax 
laws of these countries partnerships are not liable to tax as such and therefore not 
resident in terms of art 4.440 Instead, the partners are liable to unlimited taxation due 
to their residence and can accordingly resident for Convention purposes.441
                                                   
434 Frotscher (note 4) 177; Daniels (note 127) 142. 
                                                                                      
435 Barenfeld (note 27) 151. 
436 Frotscher (note 4)178. 
437 Jakob (note 148) 401. 
438 Frotscher (note 4)178. 
439 Like Germany, for example.  
440 Debatin (note 321) 1183. 
441 Debatin (note 321) 1183.  
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Whether or not a partnership is liable to tax and therewith resident in the sense of art 
4, depends therefore on its treatment for tax purposes.442 This is also confirmed by 
the Commentary to the OECD MTC as result of the OECD Partnership Report.443 As 
the above interpretation is directly based on the wording of art 4 of the Convention it 
was, however, already commonly accepted prior to the OECD Partnership Report 
and its incorporation into the commentary.444
The OECD nevertheless adds to the above interpretation by dealing with the term 
`liable to tax´ and how this term is supposed to be understood considering the 
different approaches in the countries` tax systems.
 
445 In this respect the CFA 
recognizes the problem of intermediary situations where a partnership is partly 
regarded as transparent and partly treated as non-transparent for tax purposes.446 It 
decided, however, to deal with this issue within the follow-up work to the report.447 
Furthermore, and more interesting for the purpose of this study, the Committee dealt 
with the entity approach discussed above448 and examined how the term `liable to 
tax´ should be understand in this context.449 According to the entity approach 
pursued by Germany the partnership is basically regarded as fiscally transparent but 
treated as a distinct taxpayer for the purpose of computing the income at its level, 
before allocated and taxed in the hands of the partners. In other systems even the 
final assessment of the tax is done at the partnership level.450
                                                   
442 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.1.; Frotscher (note 4) 178. 
 However, according to 
the CFA, the decisive question is whether the tax amount payable on the 
partnership`s income is determined by the characteristics of the partnership itself or 
the personal characteristics of the partners. In the latter case, as applied in Germany, 
the partnership is not liable to tax irrespective of the fact that the income is computed 
443 Art 1 para. 5 and Art 4 para. 8.7 of the Commentary on the OECD MTC 
444 Michael Lang (note 47) 35. 
445 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 14. 
446 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 14. 
447 For an analysis of this issue see Barenfeld (note 27) 153-154. 
448 See chapter C section III 2. in this study. 
449 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 14. 
450 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 14. 
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at its level. Decisive in these situations is also, that it is in fact the legal obligation of 
the partner and not of the partnership to pay the taxes.451
As assumed above, both countries treat the partnership as transparent for tax 
purposes. Therefore the partnership is not subject to tax as such and accordingly not 
entitled to the Tax Treaty benefits. Instead, the partner is entitled to treaty benefits, 
provided he is a resident of one of the contracting states.
 
452
(2) Taxation of the profits 
  
A DTC may not establish the countries` rights to tax the income.453
That requires the allocation of the income, qualified under the countries` domestic 
law to the tax treaties` different income types.
 The 
determination of the taxability of the income takes place under the domestic law of 
the contracting countries. For the purposes of this study it is however assumed that 
both countries have established those rights to tax the income domestically. The 
OECD MTC therefore applies to distribute or restrict these rights to tax already 
established.                                       
454 The income qualification is to be 
applied by both States and is therefore to be examined separately.455 Whether the 
partner of a partnership derives business income in terms of art 7 (1) of the OECD 
MTC or any other income, is generally determined by the law of the tax treaty.456 
However, since the Treaty refers to the countries` domestic law to a great extent457, 
the partner generally derives business income according to art 7, if the income was 
qualified the same way under the countries` domestic law.458 Here it is assumed that 
the partnership is carrying on a trade or business.459 The income is then to be 
qualified as business income according to the countries` domestic law.460
                                                   
451 Barenfeld (note 27) 157. This may also be helpful in cases where the tax is paid by the partnership, 
but on behalf of its partners. 
 The 
452 See German taxation chapter D section II 1.a) bb) (1).                   
453 Frotscher (note 4) 100; see also chapter D section I 2.b) in this study. 
454 Jakob 401-402. 
455 Jakob 401-402. 
456 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 148. 
457 See art 3 (2) of the OECD MTC. 
458 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 148.   
459 In contrast to private investment, resulting in other domestic income types and equally in other 
income types under the Convention. See Müller and Wangler (note 250) 148.  
460 In Germany, the partner must also qualify as entrepreneur (Mitunternehmer) of the partnership in 
order to derive business income according to s15 (1) No 2. This is however assumed hereinafter. 
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partner`s distributive share of the income of the foreign partnership falls therefore 
under art 7 (1).461
According to art 7 the concept of permanent establishment applies and decides as to 
the distribution of taxing rights between the countries.
                                                                   
462 The profits shall be taxable 
only in the State of the enterprise unless the enterprise carries on business through a 
permanent establishment in the other contracting Sate (state of source).463 In case of 
a partner of a fiscally treated foreign partnership the business enterprise actually 
carried on by the partnership is regarded as being the one of the partner.464 The 
partner `s share therefore constitutes a business enterprise465 in terms of art 7.466 
Accordingly, if the foreign partnership carries on its business activity through a 
permanent establishment, this establishment is directly attributable to the partner of 
the partnership.467 Therefore, in order to determine whether the foreign country at 
hand has the right to tax the German partner`s share of the profits, it has to be 
established whether the profits are attributable to a permanent establishment situated 
in the foreign country.468 Insofar it has generally to be considered, that the mere 
investment by a partner in a foreign partnership does not in itself constitute a 
permanent establishment in the partnership country.469The term `permanent 
establishment´ is for these purposes defined in art 5 of the OECD MTC.470
                                                   
461 Classified as `business profits .´ See Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.I.2.a)(1); Frotscher (note 
4) 181; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 148; Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.2.. 
 As 
assumed above, however, there is a permanent establishment situated in the foreign 
country. Moreover the profits are assumed to be attributable to this permanent 
establishment, as required by art 7 (1). Therefore the German partner can be 
considered to derive income attributable to a foreign permanent establishment and is 
accordingly subject to limited taxation in the foreign country on his share of the 
462 Frotscher (note 4) 172. 
463 See art 7 (1) OECD MTC. 
464 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.2.; Debatin (note 321) 1183.  
465 See art 3 (1) d OECD MTC. 
466 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 148; Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1); Debatin (note 
321) 1183. 
467 Frotscher (note 4) 172 and 242; Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1). 
468 See art 7 (1) of the OECD MTC. 
469 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.2.. 
 
470 Debatin (note 321) 1184. A partnership`s fixed place of business usually constitutes a permanent 
establishment for its foreign partner. 
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profits.471
 
 The foreign countries` domestic taxing right is insofar maintained by the 
OECD MTC.      
bb) Taxation in Germany as partner country (residence country472
(1) Entitlement to the Convention benefits 
) 
As Germany, like the foreign country, regards the partnership as transparent for tax 
purposes, the partnership is also from its perspective not a resident according to art 4 
and therefore not entitled to the Convention benefits. Instead, the partner is 
resident473 and subject to unlimited taxation in Germany474. The partner is 
accordingly entitled to the Convention benefits.475
(2) Taxation of the profits 
 
For the reasons indicated above, Germany also applies Art 7 regarding the 
partnership`s profits.476 According to Art 7 (1) Germany is entitled to tax the 
domestic partner`s distributive share of the profits of the foreign partnership.477 As 
indicated above, however, the Treaty also maintains the foreign country`s right to tax 
the same share of the profits.478 As a result the income is subject to double taxation, 
which is however eliminated by Germany, as residence country, usually by 
exempting the income from tax according to Art 23 A.479 Germany may however 
consider the exempted income and include it in the taxpayer`s tax base when 
calculating and determining the tax amount on the remaining domestic income.480
                                                   
471 See Art 7, 3 (1) (c) OECD MTC; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 149; IBFD 5.6.7.2.; Jacobs (note 
164) part 4 chapter 4 B.I.2.a) (1); Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.2.. 
 
This concept is introduced in Germany`s domestic tax law by s 32b (1) No 3 of the 
472 Under the present circumstances Germany constitutes the residence country of the partner, as the 
partner resides therein. 
473 Art 3 (1) (a), 4 (1) OECD MTC. 
474 Section 1 (1) Income Tax Act read with s 8 and s 9 Internal Revenue Code. 
475 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.1.; see also Art 1 para. 5 of the Commentary on the 
OECD MTC.  
476 See chapter D section II 1. a) aa) (2). 
477 Under German domestic law the Germany resident partner is subject to unlimited taxation on his 
worldwide income according to s 1 (1), s 15 (1) No 2 Income Tax Act in conjunction with s 8 and s 9 
Internal Revenue Code.   
478 See art 7 (1) of the OECD MTC. 
479 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.2.a). 
480 See art 23 A (3) OECD MTC; Art 23 para 14 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC. 
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Income Tax Act.481 Alternatively the double taxation is eliminated by granting a 
credit for foreign tax, depending on the individual tax treaty design.482
 
 
b. Germany applies the transparency-principle with regard to the foreign 
partnership however the foreign partnership country treats its domestic 
partnership as non-transparent for tax purposes (qualification conflict) 
 
aa) Taxation in the foreign partnership country 
(1) Entitlement to the Convention benefits  
Whether a partnership can claim Convention benefits depends on its treatment for tax 
purposes. Is a partnership treated as fiscally transparent, not the partnership itself, but 
its partners are entitled to Convention benefits, as they are the persons liable to tax. 
In contrast, if the partnership is regarded as non-transparent and liable to tax as such, 
the partnership itself is entitled to the Convention provisions. The Treaty benefits are 
accordingly allocated to the person who is liable to tax, whether it is the partnership 
itself, or the partner of the partnership. If the partnership is treated consistently by 
both Contracting states, this point leads not to further issues.483
However, entitlement to Convention benefits becomes an issue, if the countries, like 
the ones at hand, treat the partnership differently for tax purposes. 
 
According to the German understanding the partnership is treated as fiscally 
transparent and therefore not a resident of the foreign country. Entitled to the 
Convention benefits are insofar only its partners regarded as resident taxpayer in 
Germany. In the foreign partnership country, however, the partnership is regarded as 
non-transparent and liable to unlimited taxation based on its legal seat or place of 
                                                   
481 Frotscher (note 4) 89. 
482 Rijkele (note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.2.. 
483 See in this study chapter D section II 1. a). 
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effective management. 484 From the foreign country`s perspective it is therefore a 
resident, entitled to the Convention benefits.485
Questionable is, however, how this conflict may be resolved for the purposes of the 
tax treaty. 
                                                                                                                    
The answer to this, in turn, depends on whose States` qualification is considered as 
being decisive regarding the entitlement to Convention benefits. 
According to some scholars neither of the states` qualification is decisive.486 
Following the wording of art 3(2), which serves as a basic principle, the qualification 
of the entity is based on the law of the country applying the tax treaty.487 As 
discussed earlier, unless the context requires otherwise, art 3 (2) refers to the 
meaning under the domestic laws of the states applying the convention, if the terms 
are not defined in the Convention itself.488 Since the term partnership and its tax 
classification is not directly defined in the OECD MTC the contracting states may 
decide independently how they want to treat the partnership for tax purposes, by 
relying on their domestic understanding of the term.489
However, the OECD MTC generally aims at avoiding double taxation.
   
490 Yet, the 
above approach rather constitutes a main reason for the double taxation of 
partnership`s income, as its reference to the countries` domestic law regularly results 
in conflicts of their qualification affecting the tax treaty application adversely. It can 
therefore not meet the overall purpose of the OECD MTC.491 Furthermore, it enables 
the other contracting state to simply circumvent the partnership`s entitlement to the 
tax treaty benefits in its home country, by simply referring to the transparency 
principle applied according to its domestic law.492
                                                   
484 Under domestic law usually subject to some sort of corporate tax. See chapter C section IV in this 
study. 
 Such an interpretation would, 
485 Art 4 OECD MTC. See also Art 1 para. 5 and Art 4 para. 8.7 of the Commentary on the OECD 
MTC. 
486 Wassermeyer `Die Beurteilung der Abkommensberechtigung ausländischer Personengesellschaften 
durch Deutschland als dem Nichtansässigkeitsstaat der Personengesellschaft  ´(1998) IStR 489 at 489.  
487 `Lex fori interpretation .´ See Daniels (note 127) 156. 
488 See chapter B section III in this study. 
489 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 98 and 99. 
490 See chapter B section II in this study; see also para 1-3 of the Introduction of the OECD MTC. 
491 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 32. 
492 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 32. 
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however, not comply with the object and purpose of the Treaty in terms of art 31 (1) 
VCLT.493
Moreover art 3 I b OECD MTC defines the term company as `entity treated as body 
corporate for tax purposes´ ,which applies at least to the contracting state treating the 
partnership like a non-transparent corporation and makes insofar any recourse to the 
domestic law of the states unnecessary.
                                                                                                             
494 The OECD MTC consequently defines the 
entitlement to treaty benefits itself and does not leave it to the classification of the 
contracting states.495
Lang nevertheless applies Art 3 (2).
                                                                                                                                                                          
By considering the above arguments, the unrestricted interpretation according to the 
contracting states` domestic laws in terms of Art 3 (2) cannot be agreed with.      
496 He seems however to agree with the basic 
criticism above and interprets the provision therefore in a way that avoids reference 
to the countries` domestic law giving rise to qualification conflicts and undesirable 
double taxation. By considering the object of the treaty, ie to avoid double taxation, 
the phrase `unless the context otherwise requires´ shall in his opinion be interpreted 
as giving priority to the tax treaty`s autonomous interpretation from its context. The 
term `context´ must be understood in a very broad sense, including the OECD MTC, 
its commentary and `all historical, systematical and teleological aspects´. Reference 
to domestic law may only be made if the context does not provide for a reasonable 
result which is however rarely the case taking into account its broad meaning.                                                                                                
Qualification conflicts and double taxation may therefore be avoided by interpreting 
art 3 (2) as giving priority to the interpretation according to the treaty`s context. The 
term `context´ is commonly attributed a broad meaning.497
Questionable is, however, whether the wording of Art 3 (2) in fact supports the 
interpretation advocated by Lang. Insofar it is argued that the phrase `unless the 
context requires otherwise´ rather implies, that the term in question must be 
interpreted by the countries` domestic law first in order to determine whether the 
                                                       
                                                   
493 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 32. For details on 31 (1) VCLT see chapter 
B section II in this study. 
494 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A I.2.b) (2); Frotscher (note 4) 179; Müller and Wangler (note 
250) 147. 
495 Frotscher (note 4) 179. 
496 Michael Lang (note 105) at 608; Michael Lang (note 47) 21 - 27. 
497 See chapter B section III in this study. 
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context requires otherwise. 498 Both ways of interpretation according to the countries` 
domestic law and according to the context of the tax treaty are equally applicable.499 
The text of art 3 (2) gives no priority to the context. Which way of interpretation 
prevails is rather a question of the individual case. 500
Considering these arguments Lang`s approach appears not very reasonable. The 
wording of Art 3 (2) does not provide for any support in this respect. The fact that 
Lang`s interpretation would serve the purpose of the treaty and may lead to desirable 
effects does insofar not provide for a valid argument, as the clear wording of the 
treaty prevails.
                                                                                                                            
501
A different approach is advocated by the OECD CFA in its partnership report, which 
aims at dealing with qualification conflicts and solving this issue by reference to 
different cross-border partnership examples.
       
502
`…the State of source should take into account, as part of the factual context in which the Convention 
is to be applied, the way in which an item of income, arising in its jurisdiction, is treated in the 
jurisdiction of the person claiming the benefits of the Convention as a resident. If that State `flows 
through  ´the income to the partner, then the partner should be considered liable to tax and entitled to 
the benefits of the Convention of the State of which he is resident.´
 The main principles are now 
incorporated in the commentary to the OECD MTC, which states with regard to the 
present problem as follows:                                                                                                                                 
503
The State of source should accordingly take into consideration and follow the 
partnership`s treatment in the Sate where the person claiming treaty benefits is 
resident. In case of a qualification conflict the contracting countries may therefore 
deviate from the interpretation based on art 3 (2).
                                                                                                              
504
                                                   
498 Barenfeld (27) 172. 
 Instead of referring to the 
contracting states` domestic law, the tax treatment of the partnership in the residence 
country shall be relevant also for the source country. 
499 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 119. 
500 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Art 3 margin number 119. 
501 The purpose of the treaty constitutes only secondary means of interpretation according to the 
VCLT. See chapter B section II in this study. 
502 See OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 21. 
503 Art 1 para. 6.3 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC. 
504 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) para. 62. 
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This approach may lead to a reasonable result in the following constellation:                   
The source of income is situated in a country which considers the foreign partner as 
liable to tax and entitles him to the benefits of the tax treaty. The partnership and the 
partner, however, reside in the other contracting State, which treats the partnership as 
liable to tax as such and entitled to the Convention benefits.505
Applying the principle developed by the OECD CFA to this example, the State of 
source considers and follows the partnership`s tax treatment in the state of residence 
and accordingly provides for the partnership`s entitlement to the treaty benefits in 
both contracting States. That the source country follows the approach advocated by 
the OECD and accepts the treatment in the resident State, is in this case very likely, 
as the tax treatment relates to a foreign entity from its perspective.
                                                                          
506
However, the facts of the example at hand are different. The partnership country 
constitutes the residence country regarding the partnership and equally the source 
country, considering the permanent establishment situated therein. It treats the 
partnership as resident and entitled to the benefits of the OECD MTC. Germany, on 
the other hand, regards its partner as resident in Germany and entitled to the 
Convention benefits, by treating the partnership as fiscally transparent.                                                                               
 The OECD 
concept may accordingly avoid qualification conflicts in these situations and may 
therefore result in symmetry as to the entitlement to Convention benefits. 
In the present case therefore both, the partnership country and the German partner 
country constitute the state of residence for either the partnership or the partner.507 
Germany as residence country of the partner can therefore not obliged to consider the 
partnership`s tax treatment in the partnership country. Based on the wording of the 
OECD approach, the partnership country, however, would besides its residence 
status be forced to ignore `its own tax treatment of a domestic business vehicle´ as it 
equally constitutes the source country.508 It would accordingly have to follow the tax 
treatment in the German partner country.509
                                                   
505 Barenfeld (note 27) 166. 
 However, it is not very likely that the 
partnership country disregards its own classification rules regarding its domestic 
506 Barenfeld (27) 166. 
507 Barenfeld (27) 166. 
508 Barenfeld (27) 167.  
509 Barenfeld (27) 167. 
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entity forms.510 Furthermore, it regards itself not as source country, but as residence 
state of the partnership.511
The inapplicability of the above principle to these constellations was also recognized 
by the OECD itself.
 There is therefore no justification or basis for forcing the 
partnership country to consider the partner country`s classification in these situations. 
512 According to the CFA a country should never be deprived of 
its right to classify and tax its own domestic entities, irrespective of the tax treatment 
in the other contracting country.513 However, although the CFA regards its approach 
as a general principle that may be deviated from, its Partnership Report does 
nevertheless not provide for alternative solutions in this respect.514 Therefore, by 
relying solely on the approach, advocated by the OECD, the present situation would 
remain unresolved, leading to a situation where different persons are entitled to the 
Convention benefits, namely the partnership itself according to its home country`s 
perspective and the partner according to the German view. Two different DTCs 
would consequently be applicable.515
Apart from the discovered failure of the OECD approach regarding such cross-border 
partnership situations, the approach might also fail in other cases
    
516
The OECD did not change the wording of the Treaty
 due to other 
reasons. 
517
However, it remains questionable, whether the new commentary is also relevant for 
the interpretation of tax treaties concluded prior to its amendments. As discussed 
, but only the OECD 
Commentary by incorporating the new approach developed and published in the 
OECD Partnership Report. With respect to tax treaties negotiated after the new 
version of the commentary these amendments may be assumed to be considered by 
the Contracting countries. Insofar the approach of the OECD might have an impact 
on the provisions or the interpretation of the individual tax treaties.                                                                                                                   
                                                   
510 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) para 131. 
511 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 34 b. 
512 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 47. 
513 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 47. 
514 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 47; Barenfeld (note 27) 169. 
515 Stephan Gündisch `Analoge Abkommensanwendung zur Überwindung von 
Qualifikationskonflikten  ´(2005) 24 IStR 829 at 829. 
516 For instance, where source in one State and partner and partnership in the other State. 
517 For reasons see chapter B section IV 2.. 
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earlier518, the OECD advocates an ambulatory approach, meaning that the amended 
version of the Commentary may influence the interpretation of treaties concluded 
before its amendments. However as found, this approach lacks any reasoning and 
cannot be based on the provisions of the VCLT. Besides, the ambulatory approach 
does not comply with fundamental constitutional principles. The amended 
commentary is therefore generally of no impact for treaties entered into before the 
amendments, which is of significance, considering the huge amount of treaties 
concluded prior to the incorporation of the approach. Moreover, the Report lacks any 
convincing reasoning and can therefore even in this respect not be taken into account 
for earlier DTCs.519
Whether the German jurisdiction generally pursues a static or an ambulatory 
approach with regard to the OECD Commentary could not be determined with 
certainty.
 This lack of reasoning obviously narrows the impact even on 
treaties concluded after the new commentary version.                                                                                                                              
520
This rather moderate effect is also pictured by the German tax treaty practice.                                                                                                                      
The German finance administration follows the approach only to a limited extent.
 The court decisions are rather inconsistent and the BFH never clearly 
stated its position. It remains accordingly unpredictable how the courts will deal with 
this issue in future. Considering these weaknesses the relevance of the OECD 
approach is rather moderate for the actual treaty practice of the countries.  
521 
The source state must basically consider the treatment of the partnership in the 
partnership state. The income attribution rules remain, however, a matter of German 
domestic law and are to be applied irrespective of the partnerships entitlement to 
Convention benefits. As a result such entitlement comes sometimes rather to nothing. 
In a recent decision the German BFH had to deal with a situation, similar to the 
present one.522 A German individual was a limited partner of a limited partnership523
                                                   
518 See chapter B section IV 2.. 
, 
519 Michael Lang (note 47) 20. 
520 See chapter B section IV 3.. 
521 BMF 13. 1. 1997, BStBl. I 1997, 97; BMF 28. 5. 1998, BStBl. I 1998, 557; BMF 24.12.1999, 
BStBl 1999 I 1076; BMF 19. 3. 2004, BStBl. I 2004, 411. Quoted and discussed in Thomas Sliwka 
and Sebastian Schmidt `Offene Fragen zum Beschluss des BFH vom 4. 4. 2007 zur intransparenten 
Personengesellschaft im Ausland  ´(2007) IStR 694 at 695 footnote 22. 
522 BFH `Progressionsvorbehalt bei abkommensrechtlich steuerfreien Einkünften einer KG 
tschechischen Rechts  ´(2007) IStR 516 at 516. 
523 Referred to as `Komanditni Spolecnost .´ 
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situated in the Czech Republic and treated as corporation therein. The German 
individual claimed insofar a consequent application of the non-transparency principle 
also for German DTC purposes. However, the BFH only referred to the similarity 
approach when classifying the foreign entity for German tax purposes. It treated the 
entity accordingly as transparent without consideration of the treatment in the foreign 
country.524
The obvious failure of the OECD approach in the present example, however, may be 
avoided if one shapes the wording of the principle in a slightly different way. Apart 
from the OECD CFA, many German and international scholars tried to solve the 
issue of entitlement to Convention benefits in case of a qualification conflict. 
Scholars frequently followed the OECD approach after its publication.
 The German jurisdiction therefore seems rather to ignore the approach 
advocated by the OECD.     
525 However, 
some of their approaches appear slightly different compared to the exact wording of 
the OECD approach. At least according to their wording they focus only on the tax 
treatment in the partnership country, without referring to a source country as country 
following that tax treatment.526 Such an approach was also advocated prior to the 
publication of the OECD`s partnership Report.527
In short, priority is given to the tax treatment in the country where the partnership 
has its legal seat or its place of effective management.
                                                                                  
528 This wording applied to the 
present circumstances, the partner country would have to consider the tax treatment 
in the partnership country, irrespective of whether it regards itself as source or 
resident country. The qualification conflict at hand could therefore be resolved in a 
reasonable way.529
Such an approach could also be justified by reference to the treaty text. It follows 
from the OECD MTC that a partnership is a resident and entitled to the tax treaty 
                                                                                                                                 
                                                   
524 BFH (note 522) at 516. 
525 Frotscher (note 4) 179; Levedag (note 326); Müller and Wangler (note 250) at 147; Jacobs (note 
164) chapter 4 A.I.2.b)(2). 
526 Müller and Wangler (note 250) at 147; Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A. I.2.b)(2); Frotscher 
(note 4) 179; Daniels (note 127) 169. 
527 Daniels (note 127) 169. 
528 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 147; Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A. I.2.b)(2); Frotscher (note 
4) 179; Daniels (note 127) 169. 
529 Barenfeld (note 27) 168-169. 
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benefits, if it is treated as non-transparent and liable to unlimited taxation in its home 
country.530 Since a DTC is a bilateral contract, binding both contracting states,531 the 
entitlement to the provisions of the Convention must apply in relation to both States 
and should not be assessed differently.532
Whether or not the deviation from the wording of the OECD approach was 
intentional, the alternative approach, giving priority to the tax treatment in the 
partnership country constitutes at least according to its wording the more effective 
one, as it covers also cases where the OECD approach fails.
                                                                                                              
533
However, even when applying this alternative approach, it remains the risk that the 
partnership country does not even apply the tax treaty considering the specific 
circumstances of the example at hand.
   
534 The partnership country regards its 
partnership as resident taxpayer. The profits are attributable to a domestic permanent 
establishment (source) and considered as derived by the domestic partnership. Even 
if the partner country follows the partnership`s tax treatment in its home country, as 
suggested by the alternative approach, that country would regarding the partnership`s 
profits perhaps not even see the necessity to apply the treaty entered into with the 
partner country535, as it still attributes the domestically earned income to its domestic 
partnership536. From its perspective, the taxation of the profits constitutes therefore a 
domestic matter only.537
From the partner country`s perspective, on the other hand, the partner derives income 
from a foreign permanent establishment (source). The taxation therefore generally 
constitutes an international event
                                                                    
538
                                                   
530 See art 3 (1), 4 (1) OECD MTC; Frotscher (note 4) 179; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 147. 
, leading to the application of the tax treaty 
between the concerned countries. However questionable is, whether the partner 
country would in fact still be willing to apply the tax treaty, when the partnership 
531 Frotscher (note 4) 179.  
532 Frotscher (note 4) 179. 
533 Barenfeld (note 27) 168 and 169.  
534 Gündisch (note 515) at 831. 
535 This does not apply to the distributed profits. The distribution of profits to a foreign member 
constitutes no longer an entirely domestic matter. See Gündisch (note 515) footnote 14. 
536 Attribution rules are not covered by the treaty. See in this study chapter D section II 
1.b)aa)(2)(2.1).  
537 Barenfeld (note 27) 374. 
538 Concerning two countries, the residence and the source country. 
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country is not.539
In order to deal appropriately with this issue Gündisch recently came up with a new 
approach.
 If ultimately neither of the countries applies the tax treaty under 
these circumstances the income could be subject to unrelieved double taxation. 
Insofar both, the OECD approach and the suggested alternative approach fail as they 
only focus on solving the qualification conflict as such and do not address the 
specific tax situation in the partnership country under the present circumstances.      
540
Considering that a tax treaty aims at relieving income from double taxation Gündisch 
argues that these situations should have been subject to treaty regulation and 
therefore nevertheless applies a treaty in these cases by analogy.                                                                                                                                 
 He argues that the wording of the treaty does in fact not cover these 
qualification conflicts where two states due to their different tax classification of the 
partnership, attribute income to different persons. The OECD MTC`s tax provisions 
are based on double tax relief between a source and a resident country and can 
accordingly not apply if there is a `dispute over the question of which is the source 
state and which is the residence state´ and where both countries are of the view to be 
the residence country. By the same token its provisions do not cover situations where 
one country is dealing with an entirely domestic matter actually not obliged to apply 
a tax treaty.                                                                                                                                    
When applying the treaty analogously to the discussed qualification conflict the tax 
treaty interpretation shall in each country comply with their respective internal tax 
regime. 541
Applied to the present `Outbound´ investment
 Moreover the analogous interpretation should conform to the direct 
application of the tax treaty to the greatest extent possible.                                                                                                                             
542, the residence country of the partner 
must apply the treaty according to its internal tax regime. The partner country may 
therefore tax the income as residence country, but must equally grant double tax 
relief according to Art 23. The partnership state, as seen above, does not apply the 
tax treaty according to its internal tax regime.543
                                                   
539 Gündisch (note 321) at 427. 
 As a result, the partner would 
540 Gündisch (note 515) at 829. 
541 Gündisch (note 321) at 428. 
542 The Outbound situation discussed in this study corresponds to the example analyzed in the 
Gündisch articles.  
543 Gündisch (note 321) at 429. 
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however be relieved from double taxation on the income and the purpose of the tax 
treaty would accordingly be served. 
Insofar the analogous application overcomes the issue, indicated above. It is however 
not very likely, that countries will adopt this way of interpretation in practice, as it 
has not yet gained much recognition and is accordingly rather unknown to the 
countries. 
In conclusion, the wording of the approach advocated by the OECD does not apply 
to examples like the one at hand, where both countries are resident countries from 
their own perspective. As such cross-border partnership constellations occur 
frequently the approach might fail often in practice and might thus lose effectiveness 
in this respect.544
In short, there is a real risk that the qualification conflict remains unresolved and that 
the tax treaty therefore does not apply. 
 The approach may also fail in other cases, as the amended 
commentary lacks relevance for the interpretation of older DTCs and is not 
appropriately reasoned. The issue of application to the present facts could be avoided 
by amending the wording of the approach and giving priority only to the tax 
treatment in the partnership country. However, from the partnership country`s 
perspective the taxation of the profits constitutes a domestic matter only. It may 
therefore refuse the application of the tax treaty, leading to undesired double 
taxation. According to Gündisch this could be avoided by applying the treaty in such 
cases analogously. As this approach lacks recognition by the countries` treaty 
practice the issue might however remain.                                                                                                                              
545
(2) Taxation of the profits  
                                                                  
(2.1) retained profits546
                                                   
544 Barenfeld (note 27) 168. 
 
545 The following however assumes that the tax treaty between the states applies. 
546 In case of a corporation the profits are regarded as retained as long as they are not yet distributed to 
its members. These profits are generally taxed at the level of the corporation. As soon as the profits 
are distributed the taxation concerns the member receiving the distributions. Since the partnership 
country treats its domestic partnership as corporation it has to be distinguished between retained 
profits taxed at the level of the partnership when earned and distributed profits taxed in the hands of 
the partner upon distribution. 
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According to the foreign country`s tax law, the partnership is treated as a non-
transparent corporation. The partnership is therefore subject to some sort of corporate 
tax on its profits when earned.547 The income is taxed according to Art 7548, which 
leaves the right to tax with the state where the enterprise is situated, unless the profits 
are attributable to a permanent establishment in the other state. Treated as non-
transparent corporation, the partnership constitutes the partnership country`s 
enterprise in terms of Art 7 (1). The income of that enterprise is not attributable to a 
permanent establishment in Germany. The partnership country has therefore the right 
to tax the retained profits of its enterprise.549
(2.2) distributed profits
 
550
As the partnership is treated as non-transparent corporation the double-tax pattern 
applies. Profits distributed to the German partner are accordingly regarded as 
dividends in terms of art 10 (3) and subject to withholding tax upon their 
distribution.
   
551
Therefore the profits are first subject to corporate tax at the level of the partnership 
and then subject to withholding tax upon distribution. 
 The withholding tax is insofar reduced according to art 10 (2).  
 
bb) Taxation in Germany as partner country 
(1) Entitlement to the Convention benefits 
As indicated above the partnership is treated differently in both contracting states. 
According to the OECD approach it is likely that this qualification conflict remains 
in the constellation at hand. Only by applying an alternative approach, where priority 
is given to the partnership state`s tax treatment, the conflict is avoidable. Following 
such an approach Germany recognizes the partnership`s tax treatment in the foreign 
state and respects its entitlement for tax treaty purposes. For the other reasons 
                                                   
547 See in this study chapter B section IV; Levedag (note 326) margin number 516; Jacobs (note 164) 
part 4 chapter 4 B.I.2.b).. The partnership is insofar subject to unlimited taxation on its worldwide 
income. 
548 Frotscher (note 4) 182; Müller and Wangler (note 250) at 150.  
549 Müller and Wangler (note 250) at 150.  
550 See footnote 516. 
551 See art 7 (2) OECD MTC; see also Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.2.(1)(b); Gummert and 
Weipert (note 326) margin number 516;  Frotscher (note 4) 182; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 151. 
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indicated above it is however possible that the tax treaty between the countries does 
not even apply. This could only be addressed by applying the treaty by analogy, as 
advocated by Gündisch. 
(2) Taxation of the profits    
(2.1) Retained profits552
Under the circumstances of the present cross-border partnership constellation the tax 
treatment of these profits is subject to debate. In this respect German as well as 
international scholars come to completely different results.
 
553
Some scholars are of the opinion that the profits are only subject to tax in the 
partnership country.
 To be distinguished are 
mainly two different ways of treating the profits for DTC purposes. 
554 According to Art 7 the business profits are only taxable in the 
State where the enterprise earning the income is organized. From the perspective of 
the partnership country the partnership constitutes the enterprise contemplated in Art 
7. It has accordingly been conferred the exclusive right to tax the partnership`s 
profits. The partner country, on the other hand, has to exempt the profits from tax by 
accepting the `per se exemption´ in terms of Art 7. The fact that the countries treat 
the partnership differently shall insofar not be of any relevance.555
The provided exception to the `per se exemption´ leads here not to a different result, 
since the profits are not attributable to a permanent establishment in Germany.
                                                                              
556 A 
taxing right in the partner country is accordingly only imaginable upon distribution 
of the profits to the partner.557
                                                   
552 Germany generally treats the partnership as fiscally transparent. In its view the profits of the 
partnership are fully taxed in the hands of the partner when earned, irrespective of any subsequent 
profit distribution. From its perspective it has therefore basically not be distinguished between 
retained and distributed profits. However, in order to illustrate how the partnership`s different tax 
treatment in the foreign country affects the tax treaty application in Germany, the classification of 
profits in retained and distributed profits is also applied with respect to the taxation in the German 
partner country.   
 By leaving the partnership country the exclusive right 
553 For an overview see Gündisch (note 515) Footnote 20. 
554 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.2.b); Müller and Wangler (note 250) 150-151; Barenfeld 
(note 27) 188; Daniels (note 127) 164. 
555 Barenfeld (note 27) 188. 
556 See Art 7 OECD MTC. 
557 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 34 b; Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 
B.II.2.b). 
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to tax, double taxation of the retained profits is avoided without any need to apply 
Art 23 A or B. 
Other scholars, however, apply Art 7 in a different way and leave the partner country 
the right to tax the profits.558 From the perspective of the partner country the profits 
are considered to be the profits of the partner and not the partnership.559 Accordingly 
the partner constitutes the enterprise for tax treaty purposes, whose profits are 
attributable to a permanent establishment situated in the partnership country.560 As 
both States are allowed to tax the profits, double taxation occurs. The partner country 
feels accordingly obliged to exempt the profits from tax according to Art 23 A.561 
Alternatively, the partner country could grant a credit for foreign taxes.562
The BFH dealt with both opinions in its most recent decision about qualification 
conflicts.
 
563
The `per se exemption´, however, basically assumes that the partner state follows the 
tax treatment as well as the attribution of profit rules applied in the partnership 
country.
 It did, however, not follow either of the approaches taken. Although the 
opinions are different on their merits, the results are the same, at least if the latter 
approach leads to the application of the exemption method. Either double taxation is 
avoided by the `per se exemption´ in terms of Art 7 or by the application of the 
exemption method according to Art 23 A. 
564                                                                                                     In 
principle, if the source country shall follow the tax treatment of the partnership in its 
country of organization, as advocated by the OECD or the alternative approach, it 
would be desirable if the income attribution rules of that country would equally be 
applied in the source country.565
                                                   
558 Frotscher (note 4) 182. 
 If the source country is free to apply its own income 
attribution rules, its consideration of the partnership`s entitlement to treaty benefits in 
559 Frotscher (note 4) 182. 
560 See chapter D section II 1.a) aa)(2). 
561 Frotscher (note 4) 182. 
562 Some treaties are not based on the exemption method, but on the credit method.  
563 BFH (note 522) at 516. 
564 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 34 b; Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 
B.II.2.b); Müller and Wangler (note 250) 150-151; Daniels (note 127) 165.   
565 See Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.2.b); Daniels (note 127) 169. 
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the partnership country might be without effect for the actual application of the treaty 
provisions, as the qualification conflict insofar remains.566
Despite these good arguments in favor of such treaty application, it must however be 
considered, that the OECD MTC only covers the elimination of double taxation and 
does not deal with the issue of the attribution of the profits.
                                                                                                                                  
567 This is rather a matter 
of domestic law and even if the partner state accepts the partnership`s tax treatment 
and its entitlement to the Convention benefits in the partnership country for the 
purpose of the tax treaty application568
The partner country is according to its income attribution rules not prevented from 
taxing its partner as enterprise in terms of Art 7. It rather keeps the right to tax the 
profits derived by the partner and eliminates the then arising double taxation only 
subsequently by granting a tax exemption or a credit for foreign tax.  
, it may still attribute the profits to its domestic 
partner. Therefore it cannot be agreed with the first opinion which applies the `per se 
exemption´ to the present circumstances.                                                                                                                   
Even if one follows the opinion applying the `per se exemption´ in principle, it has to 
be considered that the initial facts of the example at hand are different to the facts 
normally underlying this concept. Applying the OECD approach it is not very likely 
that the partnership state follows the tax treatment in the partner state for Convention 
purposes. That is generally not to be expected from the partner state either, as it 
regards itself as resident country of the partner and not as source country.569 To 
require the partner country to abandon its own tax treatment would even contradict 
the OECD concept, which requires the source state to follow the partnership`s tax 
treatment in its home country.570
                                                   
566 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.2.b); Daniels (note 127) 164. 
 Avoidable is such an effect only by adopting the 
alternative approach and giving priority to the partnership`s tax treatment in its home 
country. It is therefore likely that the qualification conflict remains and that both 
countries apply the Treaty provisions according to their own ideas, which would 
unavoidably lead to a treaty application as advocated by the second opinion. 
567 Frotscher (note 4) 180; Guglielmo (note 52) 9.2.2.. 
568 Which is in this case not very likely when following the OECD approach. 
569 Barenfeld (note 27) 198. 
570 Barenfeld (note 27) 198. 
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According to this latter approach the income is usually subject to exemption in the 
partner state and therefore relieved from double taxation, basically irrespective of a 
qualification conflict between the countries. 571 Some countries` tax treaties are, 
however, not based on the exemption method, but on the credit method according to 
Art 23 B. Insofar the approach followed would result in the application of the credit 
method by the partner country. With regard to the application of the credit method to 
the present qualification conflicts another problem is dealt with in the commentary to 
the OECD MTC, which should however basically also apply to the application of the 
exemption method.572
According to Art 23 B the resident country shall grant a tax credit in favor of its 
resident taxpayer if his income is subject to double taxation. Insofar the commentary 
states, that Art 23 A and B deal with the issue of international juridical double 
taxation, to be distinguished from economic double taxation.
    
573 Juridical double 
taxation refers to a situation where the same taxpayer is subject to tax on the same 
income.574 Economic double taxation, however, involves two different persons 
taxable on the same income.575
In the present situation the partner country regards its resident partner as the taxpayer 
and consequently taxes the income in his hands. The partnership country, on the 
other hand, confers the tax liability on the partnership and taxes the income 
accordingly at its level. The qualification conflict therefore results in a situation 
where `both States impose tax upon the same income, but on different taxpayers´
 
576. 
This situation does not comply with the concept of international juridical double 
taxation. The partner state might accordingly not be willing to grant a credit for the 
taxes paid by another person, not regarded as the taxpayer in its view.577
                                                   
571 Frotscher (note 4) 182-183; Barenfeld (note 27) 214-215. 
 For the 
same reasons the application of the exemption method could be refused by the 
partner country, considering that the partner is actually not subject to tax in the 
572 Art 23 B para. 69.1-2 of the Commentary on the OECD MTC; OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 
para. 139.  
573 Art 23 para. 1 and 2 of the Commentray on the OECD MTC.  
574 Art 23 para. 3 of the Commentray on the OECD MTC. 
575 Art 23 para. 2 of the Commentray on the OECD MTC. 
576 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) para. 139. 
577 Barenfeld (note 27) 198. 
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foreign country, but the partnership. The taxation in the present example rather 
corresponds to the concept of economic double taxation, generally not addressed by 
the scope of Art 23.  
With respect to the credit method the commentary states however elsewhere that the 
partner country should nevertheless be obliged to grant a tax credit for the tax paid 
by the partnership in the partnership country.578 If the partner country ignores the 
partnership`s tax treatment in its home country for the purpose of taxing the partners 
share in the profits it should equally ignore that treatment for the purpose of applying 
the credit method.579 It should therefore `flow through the tax paid by the partnership 
for purposes of eliminating double taxation arising from its taxation of the 
partners´580
Despite its desirable results this latter statement appears rather contradictory, 
considering that the Commentary expressly requires the occurrence of juridical 
double taxation for the application of art 23.
. 
581 For making an exception in this 
respect the approach lacks convincing reasoning and may therefore be only of minor 
relevance for the interpretation of double tax treaties.582 As regards treaties, 
concluded prior to the amended commentary, the above applies.583 Countries might 
therefore not be willing to follow the approach contemplated in the commentary.584
Some scholars seem to follow the OECD in this respect or advocate a similar 
approach.
     
585 There is however no case law on that issue. As regards the German tax 
treaty practice, it remains therefore uncertain, whether the partner state is obliged to 
allow for relief under such circumstances.586
                                                   
578 Art 23 para 69.2 of the Commentary on the OECD MTC. 
                                                                                                               
579 Art 23 para 69.2 of the Commentary on the OECD MTC; see also OECD Partnership Report (note 
1) para. 139. 
580 Art 23 para 69.2 of the Commentary on the OECD MTC; see also OECD Partnership Report (note 
1) para. 139.  
581 Barenfeld (note 27) 197. 
582 Barenfeld (note 27) 198. 
583 See chapter B section IV 2.. 
584 Barenfeld (note 27) 198. 
585 Frotscher (note 4) 184; Daniels (note 127) 185; Michael Lang, Markus Reich, Christian Schmidt 
`Personengesellschaften im Verhältnis Deutschland –Österreich-Schweiz  ´(2007) 1 IStR  1 at 7. 
However, of other opinion is insofar Michael Lang. 
586 The BFH usually applies the exemption method in these situations. See BFH (note 522) at 516; 
Sliwka and Schmidt (note 521) at 694. 
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In principle, the concept of juridical double taxation should not serve as reason to 
refuse double tax relief in the present situation.587
(2.2) Distributed profits  
 Insofar the commentary`s 
approach can be agreed with. That the concept juridical double taxation is not 
complied with is only due to the qualification conflict arising between the countries. 
Fact is that the income is subject to double taxation, even if in the hands of different 
taxpayers. In order to serve the object of tax treaties, ie to eliminate double taxation, 
the particularities of qualification conflicts should be considered and double tax relief 
be granted, irrespective of whether the double taxation exactly corresponds to the 
concept of juridical double taxation.                                                                                                                       
However as indicated, the legal situation is unclear and the reasoning of the OECD in 
its Commentary not convincing. The present situation therefore bears the risk of 
being exposed to final double taxation.               
The foreign partnership country applies Art 10 and subjects the distributions to a 
reduced withholding tax, as indicated above. The taxing right regarding the dividends 
is according to Art 10 basically also conferred to the German partner country. 588 
However, according to the German domestic law the foreign partnership is 
considered transparent for tax purposes and following the single tax pattern the 
profits are directly and fully taxed upon earning in the hands of the partner. Later 
distributions by the partnership are non taxable and `merely seen as a transfer of 
previously taxed income´589.590 Germany has accordingly a right to tax the dividends 
according to the OECD MTC, but it has no domestic rule allowing for the taxation of 
the distributed profits.591
                                                   
587 Barenfeld (note 27) 196. 
 The distributed profits are therefore taxed only in the 
partnership country. 
588 See Art 10 (1) OECD MTC. 
589 Barenfeld (note 27) 199. 
590 Frotscher (note 4)184; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 151. 
591 It has insofar to be recalled, that the tax treaty is not able to establish taxing rights or allocate those 
rights to the Contracting countries. The determination of the taxability of the income takes place under 
the domestic law of the contracting countries and the DTC may only apply subsequently to distribute 
or restrict the rights to tax already established and claimed by each country under their domestic tax 
law.  
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However, the question arises, whether Germany is nevertheless obliged to grant a 
credit for the tax levied on the distribution in the partnership state against its taxation 
on the retained profits upon earning.592
Provided the partner country exempted the retained profits either according to the 
`per se exemption´ or the exemption method
 
593, double taxation does not arise.594 As 
the partner state does not tax the distributions either, there is in these cases simply no 
taxation against which to credit the tax levied upon distribution in the partnership 
state.595 The creditable amount then amounts to zero.596 The profits are accordingly 
be taxed only in the partnership country according to the double tax pattern, subject 
to corporate tax at the level of the partnership and subject to reduced withholding tax 
upon distribution. A tax credit is insofar out of the question.597
However, where the partner country applies the credit method
  
598 regarding to the 
retained profits the situation is different. In the partner country the profits are subject 
to full taxation upon earning according to the single tax pattern. The partnership 
country subjects the profits to corporate tax upon earning at the level of the 
partnership and levies also withholding tax upon the distribution of the profits at the 
level of the foreign partner. Both, the single tax pattern applied in the partner country 
and the double tax pattern applied in the partnership country concern accordingly the 
same profits.599 Provided the partner country grants a `credit for the tax levied in the 
partnership country on the partnership against its own tax levied in the hands of the 
partner´, the profits are only partly relieved from double taxation, as the credit only 
considers the taxation of the partnership`s retained profits and not the taxation of the 
dividends in the partnership country.600
                                                   
592 Gummert and Weipert (note 326) margin number 516; Barenfeld (note 27) 199. In case of the 
double taxation of dividends usually the credit method applies. 
 In order to fully relief the double taxation in 
these situations, the single taxation of the profits in the partner country should be 
593 As indicated there are however issues with regard to application of these methods under the present 
facts. 
594 Frotscher (note 4) 183; Barenfeld (note 27) 214-215. 
595 Art 23 para 69.3 of the Commentary on the OECD MTC; OECD Partnership Report (note 1) para. 
136; Frotscher (note 4)183; Müller and Wangler (note 250) 151. 
596 Frotscher (note 4) 183. 
597 Frotscher (note 4) 182; BFH (note 522) at 516.  
598 As indicated there is however a problem with regard to the application of this method under the 
present facts. 
599 Barenfeld (note 27) 200. 
600 Barenfeld (note 27) 205. 
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relieved not only against the taxation of the profits at the level of the partnership 
(first part of the double tax pattern), but also against the taxation of the dividends in 
the hands of the partner (second part of the double tax pattern).601
It is therefore of particular relevance whether the partner state is obliged to grant a 
credit also regarding the dividend taxation in the partnership country. 
 Otherwise double 
taxation arises. 
According to some scholars this question is to be answered in the affirmative.602 
Although the distribution as such is not subject to tax in the partner country, the latter 
has to consider that it nevertheless taxed the profits of the partnership which in fact 
constitute the amount distributed.603 Practical difficulties may, however, arise when 
the withholding tax on the distribution in the partnership country and the tax on the 
profits in the partner country are not levied in the same year of assessment.604 In 
principle, one may nevertheless also in these cases argue, that the withholding tax 
merely constitutes the additional tax on previously realized and taxed profits.605
Others, however, refuse a credit obligation of the partner state.
   
606 As the partner state 
has no right to tax the dividends at the time of the distribution, it cannot be obliged to 
grant a credit in this respect.607 As regards the German DTC practice the credit is 
particularly rejected if there is a timing mismatch, ie if the tax on retained profits in 
the partner country and the tax on the distributions are not levied in the same year of 
assessment.608 This is also confirmed by the commentary to the OECD MTC, which 
clearly distinguishes between the generation of profits and their distribution.609
                                                   
601 Barenfeld (note 27) 200. 
 It 
consequently states that `the State of residence should not be expected to credit the 
602 Frotscher (note 4) 184; Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 34 b; Sliwka and 
Schmidt (note 521) at 695.  
603 Frotscher (note 4) 184. 
604 Frotscher (note 4) 184. 
605 Aigner/Züger, SWI, 2000, 254. Quoted and discussed in Sliwka and Schmidt (note 521) at 695. 
606 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.2.b); Müller and Wangler (note 250) 151. 
607 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 151. 
608 BFH (note 522) at 516; Sliwka and Schmidt (note 521) at 695.  
609 Art 23 para. 69.3 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC; OECD Partnership Report (note 2) 
para. 137. 
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tax levied by the State of source upon the distribution against its own tax levied upon 
generation.´610
Following the latter approach, the partner country would not be obliged to grant a 
credit for the tax levied on the distribution in the partnership country against its own 
tax levied on the profits. As indicated above, this would result in unrelieved double 
taxation.  
 
The first approach seems however insofar reasonable as it considers that the partner 
country taxed the profits which are in form of distributions by the partnership to the 
domestic partner subject to further withholding tax in the partnership country.611
As indicated, the OECD Commentary does not follow this reasoning. Although it 
requires the partner state to give a credit regarding the profits taxed in the partnership 
state upon earning
 The 
same profits are therefore subject to a more burdensome taxation than actually 
intended by the country`s domestic tax systems.                                                                                    
612, this is according to the commentary not required regarding the 
distributions. However, if the partner country should ignore the tax treatment of the 
retained profits in the partnership country for the purpose of relieving double 
taxation in this respect, it should equally do so regarding the distribution613, as it is in 
fact the same income on which tax is levied.614 Therefore, as the generated and the 
distributed profits concern the same income, the above distinction made by the 
commentary makes in fact little sense.615
In principle and apart from arising practical disadvantages
                                                                                                                                                 
616
                                                   
610 Art 23 para. 69.3 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC; OECD Partnership Report (note 2) 
para. 137. 
, the partner country 
should accordingly be required to grant the credit for the tax levied on the 
distribution in the partnership country, irrespective of its own treatment of these 
distributions for tax purposes. This would also serve the object of the tax treaty, 
namely to eliminate double taxation. However, the opinions are deeply divided on 
611 See Frotscher (note 4) 184; Sliwka and Schmidt (note 521) 695. 
612 See chapter D section II 1.b)aa)(2)(2.1). 
613 Also that it may be taxed in another year of assessment. 
614 See art 23 para. 69.2 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC; Barenfeld (note 27) 204.  
615 Barenfeld (note 27) 204. 
616 The tax authorities would have to adjust the tax return, if the distribution is carried out in another 
year of assessment. See Barenfeld (note 27) 203. 
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this issue and the legal situation accordingly unclear. The risk of double taxation 
therefore remains.    
 
2. German partnership/foreign partner (`Inbound´) 
An individual is resident in a foreign country and derives as partner (P) income from 
a German partnership (PS). The German partnership carries on business through a 
domestic permanent establishment (PE). 
 
a) Taxation if both countries apply the transparency approach 
 
aa) Taxation in Germany as partnership country (source country617
(1) Entitlement to the Convention benefits 
) 
German partnerships are not entitled to the provisions of the OECD MTC, since they 
are regarded as fiscally transparent and therewith not liable to tax as such.618 Instead 
the foreign partners are entitled to the Convention benefits provided they are resident 
in the foreign country and subject to unlimited taxation therein.619
(2) Taxation of the profits 
 
When applying the OECD MTC to the income of foreign partners investing in a 
domestic partnership, Germany constitutes the source country. Insofar, the principle 
of permanent establishment applies according to Art 7.620 The foreign partner`s 
investment in a German partnership constitutes a foreign enterprise in terms of Art 
7.621
                                                   
617 Germany also constitutes the source country for the reason mentioned in footnote 430. 
 As the partnership is ignored for tax purposes its permanent establishment 
situated in Germany is directly attributable to the foreign partner. The foreign 
enterprise is accordingly to be regarded as carrying on business through a German 
permanent establishment. In Germany the partner is therefore subject to limited 
618 See art 4 OECD MTC. 
619 See art 1, 3 (1) (a), 4 OECD MTC; analogous to the German provisions: s 1 (1) Income tax Act 
read with s 8, 9 Internal Fiscal Code. 
620 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1). 
621 See discussion regarding a German partner. 
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taxation on his share of the profits attributable to the domestic permanent 
establishment.622
 
   
bb) Taxation in the foreign partner country (residence country) 
(1) Entitlement to Convention benefits 
The foreign country subjects its resident partner to unlimited taxation on his 
worldwide income. Accordingly the partner is entitled to the provisions of the OECD 
MTC.623
(2) Taxation of the profits 
  
According to Art 7 (1) Germany is entitled to tax the foreign partner`s distributive 
share of the domestic partnership`s income. According to Art 7 the foreign partners 
are subject to unlimited taxation in the foreign country on the same share of the 
income.624 The income is therefore subject to double taxation which needs to be 
avoided by the foreign country as the resident country.625
 
 
b. Germany applies the transparency principle, the partnership is however 
regarded as non-transparent in the foreign country (qualification conflict) 
 
aa) Taxation in Germany as partnership country 
(1) Entitlement to Convention benefits 
At hand the countries treat the same partnership differently for tax purposes. 
Germany regards the partnership as fiscally transparent and the partner, resident in 
the foreign country, as liable to tax and entitled to the Convention benefits. However, 
the foreign country regards the German partnership as liable to tax as such and thus 
entitled to the provisions of the OECD MTC. Accordingly both countries take the 
                                                   
622 See art 7 (1), 3 (1) (c) OECD MTC; see also Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1); Rijkele 
(note 137) Germany-Partnerships 5.6.7.2.. 
623 See Art 1, 3 (1) (a), 4 (1) OECD MTC. 
624 See art 7 (1) of the OECD MTC. 
625 See art 23 A or B OECD MTC. 
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view that the person liable to tax and entitled to the Convention benefits is a resident 
of the other country.626
According to the OECD approach the State of source shall consider and follow the 
partnership`s treatment in the state where the persons claiming treaty benefits are 
resident. Provided the partner and the partnership are situated in Germany and the 
source in a foreign country, the approach would perfectly work. The foreign country 
would have to consider the transparency principle applied in Germany and to treat 
the partner as the person entitled to the Convention benefits.
  
627 As analyzed above, 
this does however not lead to a reasonable result when the source is situated in the 
partnership country and when accordingly both contracting countries constitute the 
residence state of either the partnership or the partner.628
From the perspective of Germany the qualification conflict is rather due to the fact 
that the foreign country ignores the tax classification of its domestic partnership 
when classifying the foreign entity.
 In the present example the 
source is again situated in the partnership country and both countries consider the 
resident of the other country as entitled to the Treaty benefits. Insofar neither the 
partnership country nor the country of the partner refers to the residence state. The 
OECD approach therefore again fails to apply on the basis of its wording. 
629 In this situation, it is therefore not very likely 
that Germany, although source country630, recognizes the partnership`s tax treatment 
in the foreign country by disregarding the tax classification of its own domestic 
entity.631 It has to be considered that the partnership is not even entitled to the 
Convention benefits, as it is not a resident in the foreign country where it is 
considered as non-transparent entity.632
                                                   
626 Barenfeld (note 27) 136. 
 The foreign partner country, on the other 
hand, cannot be regarded as the source country and is therefore according to the 
wording of the OECD approach not obliged to consider the tax treatment of the 
partnership in its home country. The qualification conflict might in this case 
627 Frotscher (note 4) 185. 
628 See chapter D section II 1.b) aa)(1). 
629 Barenfeld (note 27) 167. Although the arguments referred to another example, they can equally be 
applied here. 
630 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A. II.. 
631 Barenfeld (note 27) 167. 
632 Frotscher (note 4) 181 and 185; Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 A. II.; See also the requirements 
of Art 4 OECD MTC. 
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therefore remain. Neither the partner, as not resident in Germany in terms of Art 4, 
nor the partnership could claim tax treaty benefits with respect to the partnership`s 
income.633 By the same token neither of the contracting countries would provide for 
double tax relief.634 The fact that the approach may fail under specific circumstances 
is recognized by the OECD with respect to the `Outbound´ situation discussed 
earlier.635
This issue could only be resolved by following the alternative approach, which gives 
priority to the tax treatment of the partnership in its home country. Like in the 
`Outbound´ example discussed above, this approach does also apply to the situation 
at hand and would require the foreign partner country to follow the tax treatment of 
the partnership in Germany.
 Although not specifically dealt with in the OECD Partnership Report, this 
is also the case with the situation at hand. 
636
If the countries follow the approach advocated by the OECD the qualification 
conflict might remain under the present circumstances. This could only be avoided 
by giving priority to the tax treatment of the partnership in its home country.       
 Accordingly the partners, resident in the foreign 
country, would be entitled to the Convention benefits for both contracting countries. 
(2) Taxation of the profits 
According to Art 7 (1) Germany is entitled to tax the foreign partner`s share of the 
domestic partnership`s income when earned.637 The different tax treatment of the 
partnership in the foreign country is insofar of no impact.638
 
 
bb) Taxation in the foreign partner country  
(1) Entitlement to the Convention benefits 
As set out above, the partners must be considered as being entitled to the treaty 
benefits by the foreign country. Otherwise, the conflict of qualification and its 
adverse effects remain.  
                                                   
633 OECD Partnership Report (note 1) 20-21. 
634 Barenfeld (note 27) 164. 
635 See OECD Partnership Report (note 1) para. 131. 
636 See also Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 34 e. 
637 Barenfeld (note 27) 141-142. 
638 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1). 
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(2) Taxation of the distributed profits 
As regards the taxation of the partner in the foreign country the distributed profits are 
of relevance only.639 These profits are generally regarded as dividends from the 
foreign state`s perspective.640 Article 10 is however generally not applicable as the 
dividends cannot be regarded as being paid by a resident of the other contracting 
country.641
Some scholars allocate the distributed profits to the business profits under Art 7.
 Which distributive provision of the OECD MTC applies instead, is 
subject to debate among scholars. 
642 
According to Art 7 the country of the enterprise has the exclusive taxing right 
regarding the profits.643 From the perspective of the foreign partner country this 
enterprise is situated in Germany. The profits are therefore to be exempted in the 
foreign country.644
Others
    
645, however, consider the distributed profits as other income according to Art 
21, which confers the exclusive taxing right in the present circumstances to the 
partner country.646
The problem with this approach is that it results in double taxation of the profits.
  
647 
The partnership country taxes the income according to Art 7 fully upon earning 
based on the single-tax pattern. According to art 21 the partner country may tax the 
profits upon distribution according to the second part of the double-tax pattern.648
                                                   
639 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1); Barenfeld (note 27) 142. As far as the perspective of 
the partner country is concerned, tax on the retained profits of the partnership, regarded as non-
transparent, is levied when earned at the partnership`s level in its home country, ie  Germany. 
 As 
the income is already subject to full taxation upon earning, the tax upon distribution 
can be regarded as additional and beyond what is in fact intended under a single and 
double tax pattern. 
640 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1). 
641 See Art 10 (1) OECD MTC; see also Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1); Vogel (note 
16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 34 c. The partnership is not a resident in the partnership 
country, as it is considered as fiscally transparent.   
642 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1). 
643 See Art 7 (1) OECD MTC. 
644 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1). 
645 Vogel (note 16) OECD-MA Artikel 1 margin number 34 c. 
646 See Art 21 (1) OECD MTC. 
647 Jacobs (note 164) part 4 chapter 4 B.II.1.a)(1). 
648 According to the approach based on Art 21 OECD MTC. 
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However, situations like the one at hand merely refer to a direct investment which 
regularly leads to the application of either Art 7 or Art 10. Article 21 does therefore 
not apply. It has nevertheless to be considered that the German partnership country 
does not tax the distributed dividends. Therefore the partner country might not be 
willing to relief the income according to Art 7, as the dividends are from this 
perspective in fact not subject to double taxation as such.649 That the same income is 
taxed in the partnership country as profits upon earning might insofar not be 
convincing, as the Commentary makes a clear distinction between generated profits 
and distributed dividends.650
 
 For the reasons above, however, this should not serve as 
a reason to refuse double tax relief. Due to legal uncertainty in this respect, the risk 
of double taxation nevertheless remains. 
 
E. Alternative approach to the issue of qualification conflicts  
As seen in the previous parts, qualification conflicts lead to very complex issues with 
regard to the application of the OECD MTC and its double tax relief obligations. All 
approaches discussed regarding these issues aimed at resolving existing qualification 
conflicts in order to provide for the relief of double taxation. As found, when 
applying the different approaches to the examples above, the application of the tax 
treaty and the relief from double taxation remains in many instances nevertheless a 
matter of legal uncertainty.  
 
Alternatively to these attempts, however, an approach could aim at avoiding a 
qualification conflict before its occurrence.  
In order to avoid the occurrence of qualification conflicts with regard to cross-border 
partnerships one must address the origin of these conflicts.651
                                                   
649 Barenfeld (note 27) 216. 
 A qualification conflict 
dealt with in this study refers to a situation where the same entity is treated as non-
650 Art 23 para. 69.3 of the Commentaries on the OECD MTC. 
651 See chapter C section VI. 
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transparent in one country and as transparent in the other country.652 As discussed 
above, that may occur if two or more countries classify the same entity differently, as 
corporation or as partnership for tax purposes. That may also occur if countries treat 
partnerships generally as fiscally non-transparent. A conflict of qualification may 
then arise if the other country classifies the partnership as fiscally transparent, even if 
the entity is consistently classified as partnership by both countries.653
In short, a conflict of qualification occurs if either the same entity is classified
                                                                                              
654
In order to ensure consistent qualification of entities both of these causes must be 
addressed. To be clarified is insofar the main reason for the different tax 
classification or treatment of the same entity. Insofar the classification of entities for 
tax purposes shall serve as a point of departure. 
 
differently or treated differently for tax purposes in two or more countries.  
Countries either classify their own domestic entities or foreign entities for domestic 
tax purposes. However, as found above and confirmed by the OECD a country has a 
`sovereign right to create its own entities´ and shall never be deprived of its right to 
classify and tax these domestic entities as it finds appropriate.655 By the same token a 
country cannot be forced to re-characterize a domestic entity in order to resolve a 
qualification conflict with a foreign country which disregards the entity`s 
characteristics in its home country and classifies it differently for tax purposes. 656 
Therefore, when trying to avoid qualification conflicts one has to deal with the 
countries` classification and treatment of foreign, not domestic entities.657
Countries` apply different methods to classify foreign entities. As seen above, none 
of these methods is able to avoid qualification conflicts, but rather constitutes the 
main reason for this issue. This is mainly due to the fact that the foreign entity`s 
classification and tax treatment in its home country is usually ignored when 
classifying the foreign entity for domestic tax purposes. The same entity may 
  
                                                   
652 Frotscher (note 4) 170; Barenfeld (note 27) 3. Also referred to as `asymmetrical sitiuation .´ 
653 Frotscher (note 4) 170; Brincker (note 154) 552.   
654 Which results in a different treatment for tax purposes. 
655 Barenfeld (note 27) 256. 
656 Barenfeld (note 27) 168. 
657 Barenfeld (note 27) 256 and 257. The country, not constituting the country where the entity is 
organized, should accordingly provide for the consistent qualification of entities. 
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therefore be classified as non-transparent corporation subject to the double tax 
pattern in one country and as fiscally transparent partnership subject to the single tax 
pattern in the other country. Moreover, even if equally classified as partnership by 
both countries, the entity may be treated transparent in one country and non-
transparent in the other country. Therefore, as partnerships constitute internationally 
a very heterogeneous entity form in terms of legal features and tax treatment it is 
very likely that partnerships are either classified differently as corporation or 
partnership658
 
 or treated differently for tax purposes. Therefore, since neither of the 
countries` classification methods considers the tax treatment of the entity in its 
country of organization they all give rise to qualification conflicts.  
The non-consideration of the foreign partnership`s tax treatment in its home country 
can therefore be regarded as the main reason for the different tax treatment of 
partnerships in the countries concerned.  
The classification methods applied by the countries for the classification of foreign 
entities could therefore be utilized in a modified form in order to ensure a consistent 
qualification of entities by the contracting countries. It has to be determined 
however, which method is most qualified in this respect. As both, the fixed approach 
and the elective approach do not consider any characteristics of a foreign entity the 
similarity approach, at least taking into account the legal features of a foreign entity, 
seems to serve as the most appropriate point of departure for the creation of a method 
avoiding qualification conflicts.659
The similarity method can be summarized as referring to the legal features of a 
foreign entity, comparing them to the legal features of domestic entities and then 
applying the domestic tax treatment applicable to the entity most resembling the 
foreign entity under examination.
  
660
                                                   
658 Which in turn usually leads to a different treatment for tax purposes, as corporations and 
partnerships are usually subject to different tax patterns. See insofar chapter C section IV. 
 After considering the legal characteristics of the 
foreign entity, the classifying country applies domestic tax law, without the 
consideration of the entity`s actual tax treatment in its home country.  
659 Barenfeld (note 27) 258 - 263. 
660 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 146. 
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This may lead to considerable issues. As partnerships constitute very heterogeneous 
entity types the comparison of a foreign partnership with domestic entities can lead 
to an entity classified and treated as partnership in the foreign country and as 
corporation in the classifying country.661
As suggested by Jesper Barenfeld, this may only be avoided by a so called `tax – 
oriented´ similarity approach
 Besides, even if the classifying country`s 
comparison to domestic entity types leads to a foreign entity classified as partnership 
in both countries, the classifying country only refers to its tax treatment of domestic 
partnerships and may therefore treat it differently in this respect as the partnership`s 
home country does. The Similarity approach therefore bears the two reasons for 
qualification conflicts, ie the different classification and the different treatment of the 
same entity for tax purposes. 
662, ie a similarity approach only referring to the tax law 
characteristics of the foreign entity in its home country.663 According to such an 
approach an entity treated as non-transparent in its country of organization would be 
treated in the other classifying country like its domestic entity types featuring the 
most resembling tax treatment, ie also as non-transparent according to the double-tax 
pattern.664. By the same token an entity would be treated as transparent in both 
countries if it is treated that way in its home country.665 The respective tax treatment 
would be applied by the countries irrespective of the entity`s designation as 
partnership or corporation.666 It would be the same regardless of where the entity`s 
owner resides or where the entity`s source is situated, as these classifying countries 
only take the tax treatment in the entity country into account.667
                                                   
661 Conversially, a foreign partnership may be regarded as corporation in the classifying country after 
comparison to domestic entity types. 
 Therefore, even if 
662 Analyzed by legal scholars as alternative approach. See insofar van Raad, Recognition of foreign 
entities as taxable entities (1988) 57, 58 and Avery Jones et al., Characterization of Other States` 
Pertnerships for Income Tax (2002) 314, 315; quoted in Barenfeld (note 27) 262. 
663 Barenfeld (note 27) 261, 262. 
664 Usually country of owner or source. 
665 Barenfeld (note 27) 261. 
666 Insofar it has to be considered, that qualification conflicts refer to a situation where the same entity 
is treated differently for tax purposes. Its designation as partnership or corporation is insofar not 
decisive, as some countries treat partnerships like corporations for tax purposes.  
667 Barenfeld (note 27) 256-257. 
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the cross-border partnership structure involves more countries668
As the approach normally leads to consistent qualification of the entity and therewith 
consistent application of the tax treaty, double taxation would be regularly relieved in 
cross-border partnership cases.
, the tax oriented 
similarity approach would still lead to consistent qualification of the partnership. 
669
In view of these positive effects, the adoption of such an approach should be 
considered with respect to the German tax practice. As Germany already applies a 
similarity approach for the classification of foreign entities, a tax oriented similarity 
approach would only require the further development of the existing system, rather 
than the introduction of a completely new classification regime.
 
670
The adoption of a tax oriented similarity approach in Germany might, however 
encounter resistance for other reasons.  
 Insofar the 
approach has potential. 
If countries treat foreign entities based on their foreign tax characteristics, the entity 
may be treated differently than corresponding domestic entities.671 Some German 
scholars therefore argue that the consideration of foreign tax characteristics may 
violate the principle of equality of taxation.672 According to that constitutional 
principle, identical economic circumstances must be treated equally for tax purposes 
irrespective of whether realized domestically or abroad. Such concerns with respect 
to a tax oriented classification of foreign entities are also shared by other 
international scholars.673
                                                   
668 Where the partnership, situated in one country, has income sources and/or partners in more than 
one foreign country. 
 According to them the method may be discriminatory, as it 
may result in foreign entities being treated differently compared to domestic entities, 
although sharing similar or identical characteristics. 
669 See the cases under chapter D where both countries treat the same entity as transparent for tax 
purposes.  
670 Barenfeld (note 27) 261. For these reason the approach has also potential internationally, as many 
countries already apply the basic similarity approach.  
671 Barenfeld (note 27) 332-333. 
672 Müller and Wangler (note 250) 146.  
673 Van Raad, Recognition of foreign entities as taxable entities (1988) 57, 58. Quoted in Barenfeld 
(note 27) 262. 
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Questionable is, however, whether the approach would in fact lead to such 
discriminatory treatment. Insofar it is argued that discrimination cannot occur in case 
of a qualification conflict, as the entities are not placed in the same circumstances.674 
A foreign entity which corresponds to a domestic entity in all aspects, except for its 
tax characteristics, cannot be regarded as being placed in identical circumstances. If a 
foreign partnership is treated as non-transparent for tax purposes and domestic 
partnerships seen as fiscally transparent, the classification of the foreign entity as 
non-transparent does not discriminate between the domestic and the foreign 
partnership, as these partnerships are not placed in identical circumstances.675
The argument that the entities must be placed in identical circumstances in order to 
be subject to a non-discrimination provision appears very reasonable. Discrimination, 
by definition, has to be determined on `objects or subjects of the same kind and in the 
same circumstances´.
 The 
different classification for tax purposes is insofar not discriminatory. 
676 In context of a non-discrimination rule regarding the 
taxation of entities, the tax treatment of these entities constitutes the decisive factor 
to establish whether the entities are in the same circumstances and therewith 
comparable.677
Other problems might arise when applying the approach in practice. In order to 
recognize the tax treatment of foreign entities, the classifying country has to know 
about the entity`s tax treatment in its home country. However, as discussed above, 
the normal similarity approach has to deal with different foreign general law 
characteristics of the entity in its home country and has to compare them with 
German entity types, featuring similar or identical characteristics. Compare to this 
complex process the tax oriented similarity approach leads rather to simplification, as 
it only focuses on one tax characteristic, ie whether the entity is treated as transparent 
or non-transparent. This is particularly advantageous concerning heterogeneous 
 A foreign partnership treated as transparent is accordingly not in the 
same circumstances as a domestic partnership treated as non transparent. The 
concerns above are therefore not able to stop the tax oriented similarity approach.           
                                                   
674 Barenfeld (note 27) 334-343. This was analyzed with respect to art 24 OECD MTC. The results 
may however also be applied to other discriminatory provisions or principles. 
675 Barenfeld (note 27) 338 -340. 
676 Barenfeld (note 27) 341. 
677 Barenfeld (note 27) 342; see also Art 24 para. 3 Commentaries on the OECD MTC. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
101 
 
entity types, like partnerships. Furthermore, as relating to the normal similarity 
approach, the German tax administration could release guidelines or lists with 
foreign entity types in different countries in order to assist the authorities when 
applying the tax oriented similarity approach.678
Problems from an administrative perspective are therefore minor and can 
consequently not serve as a reason to object a tax oriented similarity approach. 
 Insofar the list must only state the 
tax treatment of the foreign entities in their home countries.  
However, the tax oriented similarity approach would only accomplish consistency in 
all matters, if it is adopted in the domestic tax law of a country.679 As indicated 
above, a tax treaty does only cover the elimination of double taxation, but not the 
classification of the entity for domestic tax purposes and the attribution of its income. 
The adoption of the approach in a tax treaty would therefore only influence the 
determination of who is entitled to the Convention benefits.680 The question of who 
the income is attributed to lies outside the scope of a tax treaty.681 The above issues 
regarding the application of the tax treaties and its double tax relief rules would 
remain, as the domestic qualification conflict prevails.682
With this in mind, the tax oriented similarity approach constitutes in principle a 
promising opportunity to solve the issue of qualification conflicts between countries 
at its roots. Although accompanied by legal amendments and administrative efforts it 
would regularly result in relief of double taxation regarding cross-border partnership 
situations and therewith provide for some tax certainty in this respect. Adopted by all 
countries the approach could even accomplish this on a worldwide basis.      
 The approach must 
therefore be in German domestic law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
678 Barenfeld (note 27) 262. 
679 Barenfeld (note 27) 352. 
680 Barenfeld (note 27) 352. 
681 See chapter D section II 1.b)bb)(2)(2.1). 
682 Barenfeld (note 27) 352. 
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F. Conclusion 
Due to its different tax treatment in different countries a partnership gives in a cross-
border situation rise to many issues regarding the application of tax treaties. As seen 
in the discussed `Outbound´ and `Inbound´ examples the issues particularly concern 
the entitlement to the tax treaty benefits and the treaty`s double tax relief provisions. 
In either case the qualification conflict may prevent the tax treaty from providing 
double tax relief. 
The different approaches applied to the examples may insofar not serve as an 
appropriate solution of these issues. The OECD approach may apart from its other 
weaknesses basically solve the issue of qualification conflicts in other cross-border 
constellations. It does however not address the specific issues of the `Outbound´ and 
`Inbound´ situation discussed. Neither does the committee provide for any alternative 
suggestions in this respect. The risk of double taxation therefore remains and leaves 
these situations with legal uncertainty and unpredictability from the taxpayer`s and 
tax administration`s point of view.  
This is deplorable, considering the following statement in the OECD MTC about the 
issue of double taxation: 
`Its harmful effects on the exchange of goods and services and movements of capital, technology, and 
persons are so well known that it is scarcely necessary to stress the importance of removing the 
obstacles that double taxation presents to the development of economic relations between countries.´ 
A `tax oriented similarity approach´ may serve as an appropriate attempt to ensure 
double tax relief also in situations like the Outbound and Inbound above. 
Qualification conflicts may arise in endless different cross-border partnership 
constellations, including triangular situations, and may insofar result in countless 
different issues regarding the application of tax treaties. Approaches aiming at 
solving these issues, like the ones discussed, therefore cannot address all imaginable 
cross-border constellations. The tax oriented similarity approach, however addresses 
the issue of qualification conflicts at its roots and thereby avoids their occurrence in 
the first place. According to that approach countries, when classifying foreign 
entities for domestic tax purposes, shall only refer to the foreign entity`s tax 
treatment in its country of organization and shall treat the foreign entity for domestic 
tax purposes like its domestic entity types featuring the most resembling tax 
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treatment. A qualification conflict would therefore not arise as the entity is treated 
the same way in terms of taxation by all countries involved. Issues with regard to tax 
treaty application would not arise and double taxation regularly be avoided. As found 
there are no convincing reasons to refuse such an approach, especially in view of its 
potential with regard to cross-border partnership cases.  
Unfortunately it has rather rarely been subject to analysis in legal writings683
However, its potential should be more recognized. The approach constitutes a way to 
address the issue of qualification conflicts on a very broad basis. As seen in this 
study the issue remains an uncertain area of law with deeply dividing opinions. There 
is so far no single convincing concept to deal with all the tax problems involved. The 
tax oriented similarity approach should therefore appear more frequently in academic 
writings and be subject to further analysis and development, considering the 
increasing importance of partnerships as instrument of international investments.    
, which 
might be due to discrimination considerations and required radical amendments of 
countries` domestic tax systems not already applying the basic similarity approach 
for the classification of foreign entities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
683 See Barenfeld (note 27) chapter 9; van Raad, Recognition of foreign entities as taxable entities 
(1988) 57, 58 and Avery Jones et al., Characterization of Other States` Pertnerships for Income Tax 
(2002) 314, 315. Both quoted in Barenfeld (note 27) 262.  
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